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Abstract 
This Article analyzes the Financial Crisis of 2008 in the context of failures by 
market participants to engage in private ordering thus leading to opportunistic 
behavior at the expense of market stability.   The Financial Crisis of 2008 offers a 
decidedly negative verdict on a decades-long project to deregulate financial 
markets and rely on private ordering mechanisms, including securitization and 
default swaps, to mitigate opportunistic behavior and improve market efficiency.    
Although the regulatory approach of the past two decades, which relied in great 
measure on private parties fending for themselves, helped to generate a number of 
innovations and positive developments in finance, it ultimately failed to bring 
about more resilient financial markets and instead fell victim to market failures.  
For example, the market for mortgage securitizations found itself subject to 
adverse selection biases leading to a lemons market for asset-backed securities.  
At the same time, developments in derivative markets made it possible for central 
actors there to engage in more risk (moral hazard) than was optimal.   Ultimately, 
parties that should have engaged in private ordering did not. 
As a consequence, we are left searching for a new regulatory path forward that 
recognizes that market participants are human agents subject to the frailties of 
cognitive limitations, euphoria and perhaps even the occasional self-delusion.  
What is required is a close examination of the institutional and micro incentives 
(including incentives of agents) in order to strike a balance between market-based 
regulation and a more interventionist approach to regulating markets.  A more 
pragmatic approach to market regulation recognizes that the earlier hands-off 
approach to regulation resulted in over-reliance on weak heuristics and little by 
way of robust private ordering.  A new more pragmatic vision of market 
regulation will likely stop short of legislating against bubbles, but could, and 
should, result in less systemic risk and a more sustainable growth trajectory going 
forward.  
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Section 1:  Introduction 
In October 2008, Alan Greenspan, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, 
appeared before a committee of the House of Representatives and pronounced himself  “in a 
state of shocked disbelief” that sophisticated market participants had permitted themselves to 
engage in an orgy of reckless lending and ill-advised risk-taking and, in the process, had failed to 
protect themselves from their own fecklessness.1  The consequence of this failure was the near 
collapse of credit markets and a more general deterioration of economic conditions during in the 
second half of 2008, continuing into 2009 (the “Financial Crisis of 2008”).  Although a number 
of specific forces operating in concert produced the dramatic market disruptions that motivated 
Mr. Greenspan’s shock, perhaps the single most important was the failure of sophisticated 
investors in financial markets to conform to an ideological vision of efficient markets.  Such a 
vision understands markets to be sustainable and self-correcting institutions, which require little 
if any regulatory oversight.   This vision understands that incentives will induce parties to engage 
in private ordering of transactions thereby promoting efficient outcomes and dissuading 
opportunism.  This vision of market behavior motivated much of the deregulatory swing that 
dominated much of the past three decades.   Recent events indicate that the impetus for 
deregulation may have run its course and that a new regulatory way forward will be required.    
This Article is one of the first to delve into the systematic causes of the Financial Crisis 
of 2008 and to propose policy changes to address the underlying regulatory weaknesses revealed 
by the crisis.  More importantly, this Article begins a more general inquiry into the failure of 
private ordering mechanisms to protect markets during the Financial Crisis of 2008 and argues 
that our collective mistake has been in designing a regulatory structure that adopted the 
                                                            
1 Alan Greenspan, Testimony before the House Committee of Government Oversight and Reform, October 23, 2008. 
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assumptions of an overly ideological vision of the market model that ignores market failures 
(transaction and agency costs and well as behavioral phenomena).2  Rather, this Article argues 
that an over-reliance on private ordering has systematically failed to generate robust responses to 
market failures.  The fragility of private ordering suggests going forward we must reorient our 
regulatory structures.  Rather than rely primarily on private ordering, a more active regulatory 
structure is required to support robust institutions with private ordering playing a supporting role.  
Additionally, any new regulatory effort must recognize that market participants often 
systematically misprice assets in the marketplace and design a pragmatic structure that limits the 
ability of such mistakes to act as financial accelerators in times of distress.3   
The problems of asymmetric information and lemons markets are ever-present in 
financial transactions.4  Unless there are sufficient contractual safeguards in the form of private 
ordering or formal regulatory structures, financial markets will be vulnerable to opportunistic 
                                                            
2 In a world where information is costless and market participants are rational actors without agency costs, they will 
protect themselves through private ordering.  Indeed, in such a world, there may be little place for regulation and the 
law.  Of course, recent experience suggests that placing total confidence in markets and market participants to may 
go too far. R.H. Coase, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW (1988) at 15 (noting that a world with zero 
transaction costs does not exist).   Also see Robert C. Merton and Zvi Bodie, Design of Financial Systems: Towards 
and Synthesis of Function and Structure, 3 J. INVESTMENT MAN. 1 (2005).  
3 Two asset price bubbles during the past decade are ample evidence of our collective susceptibility to bubbles.  
Kindleberger notes euphoria as critical to the development of a bubble in asset prices.  Charles P. Kindleberger and 
Robert Aliber, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (2005).   Schiller similarly notes 
that market participants are often guided by ‘animal spirits’.  Robert J. Schiller, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2006).   
Lack of perfect foresight combined with self-delusion of the type described by Kindleberger and Schiller makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, to effectively legislate against the development of asset bubbles.  However, it is not 
impossible to create regulatory circuit breakers to cabin risks in times of distress and thereby limit the danger posed 
by such speculative activity.    
4 Both adverse selection and moral hazard are problems of asymmetric information and are symptomatic of lemons 
markets.  Where adverse selection is present, the seller has more information about the underlying value of an asset 
than the buyer and the seller is able to conceal that information.  As a consequence, the average value of assets in 
such a market will be less than an “independent marker” that sets the average price for the market (a “lemons 
market”).   Where moral hazard is present, a buyer of, for example, an insurance policy, has more information about 
his ex post behavior than the insurer.  Knowing that he will not bear the full burden of the costs of his actions 
encourages buyers to take on more risk than is optimal from the point of view of the insurer.   George Akerlof, The 
Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).  Hayne E. Leland 
and David H. Pyle, Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FINANCE 
371, 371 (1977); and see Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell, Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit 
Rationing, 90 Q. J. ECON. 651, 651-652 (1976) (on lemons markets in lending).   
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behavior by counterparties exemplified by the occasional panic and market crash.5   Until the 
Financial Crisis of 2008 the dominant approach towards regulation held that sophisticated market 
participants would seek to protect themselves by relying on private ordering mechanisms and 
thus intrusive government regulation would be both unnecessary and inefficient.6    
Notwithstanding this view, in the absence of regulatory supervision, credit and derivative 
markets increasingly became to resemble financial lemons markets in the years leading up to the 
Financial Crisis of 2008.7    Securitization and credit derivatives, which were intended to be 
private ordering innovations adding to market resilience, became sources of information 
asymmetries and general market instability. 
The ability of a mortgage originator to package and sell mortgage assets through 
securitization created an incentive for mortgage originators to engage in adverse selection.  This 
was particularly true at the tail end of the recent real estate bubble when securitized assets 
continued to receive AAA ratings despite the lower quality of the loans making up the pool.    
Second, the opaque nature of the credit derivative (i.e. credit default swap) market made it 
difficult, if not impossible, for counterparties to assess the risks other market participants were 
accepting, thereby leaving them vulnerable to moral hazard risks as counterparties took on more 
risk than was optimal.  In both cases, these market failures were facilitated by regulatory 
                                                            
5 Walter Bagehot, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET (2005 reprint) at 21 (describing how 
a lack of confidence in counterparties leads to a panic in the financial market). Also see Ben Bernanke, Clearing and 
Settlement during the Crash, 3 REV. FIN. STUD.133, 142 (1990) (noting that financial markets may be susceptible to 
information asymmetry problems); Leland and Pyle, supra, note 4 (noting that financial markets may be susceptible 
to information asymmetry problems). 
6  One of the principal academic contributions that marked the intellectual high point of the revolution in finance 
was publication of Kendall’s hypothesis of the efficient capital markets in 1953.  Maurice Kendall, The Analysis of 
Economic Time Series, Part I: Prices, 96 J. ROYAL STATISTICAL SOCIETY 11 (1953).  This and subsequent 
developments in finance were enthusiastically imported into the law regulating corporations and financial markets.  
For example, the Supreme Court adopted a “fend for themselves” standard for sophisticated investors with respect to 
securities issuances in Ralston Purina as a basis for market regulation.  SEC v Ralston Purina Co., 346 US 119 
(1953).   
7 The presence of asymmetric information in the financial markets can lead to a loss of trust and collapse as 
suggested by Akerlof in his lemons market model.  Akerlof  supra, note 4(for a discussion of the lemons market).   
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structures that relied on private parties, including rating agencies, to manage risks rather than 
more intrusive government regulation.  In both cases, these private parties failed to effectively 
manage these risks leading to a financial lemons market.  This financial lemons market  turned 
out to be a dangerous financial accelerator transmitting negative shocks throughout the financial 
system.8  
Finally, the growing complexity of the securitized asset and derivative markets led even 
sophisticated investors to search for rules of thumb, or heuristics, to help guide investment 
decisions.  In the run up to the Financial Crisis of 2008, the private rating agencies provided 
letter-grade ratings to assist investors.   Although the ratings were intended to play an important 
private ordering role, they were susceptible to a conflict of interest with issuers of securities.  At 
the same time investors placed undue reliance on this heuristic.  Ultimately the letter-grade 
ratings facilitated the development of lemons markets for securitized products and moral hazard 
in the credit derivatives market.      
The proper role of regulation of the financial system should be to reduce the likely 
negative externalities associated with the occasional, yet predictable, speculative bubble, while 
preserving incentives for risk taking.  For instance, creating circuit-breakers between different 
segments of the financial system provides regulators with opportunities to break the daisy-chain 
connections that create systemic risk in times of stress. It also ensures that while some sectors are 
able to pursue high risk activities, other sectors, like banking, are segregated from such risk 
                                                            
8 Ben Bernanke, et al, The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality, 78 REV OF ECON AND STAT 1 
(1996)(defining financial accelerators).  In his 2002 letter, Warren Buffet accurately predicted how a daisy-chain of 
counterparty failures could lead to a broader collapse.  Berkshire Hathaway, Annual Report to Shareholders 
available at www.berkshirehathaway.com at 15.  Warren Buffet’s understanding of this daisy-chain problem stems 
partly from his involvement with Long Term Capital Management in 1998, which he nearly rescued from collapse.  
Roger Lowenstein, WHEN GENIUS FAILED (2000) at 181-184. 
8 
 
taking.  This pragmatic approach thus balances maximization norms with a requirement for 
stability in the financial system resulting in less systemic risk and a more sustainable growth 
trajectory going forward.   A more workable regulatory structure also requires that parties reduce 
their reliance on faulty heuristics, like letter-grade credit ratings.  However, such an approach 
requires a wholesale reinvention of our basic course of financial regulation as it has developed 
over the past three decades. 
This Article proceeds as follows:  Section 2 identifies the roots of the Financial Crisis of 
2008.  Three inter-related issues (deregulation and financial innovation; easy credit; and the 
subsequent housing bubble), while not the exclusive causes of the Financial Crisis of 2008, were 
central to it.  In particular, this section highlights the regulatory system’s reliance on private 
ordering to manage risk and constrain opportunistic behavior by counterparties.      
Section 3 examines the incentives in the securitization process that created a systematic 
adverse selection bias.  Private parties in these markets relied on ratings as a rule of thumb to 
guide, or heuristic, their decision-making and constrain opportunistic behavior.  Rather than 
alleviate information asymmetries, reliance on these heuristics may have generated incentives for 
the development of a lemons market for securitizations.  Section 4 examines the development of 
moral hazard arising from the opaque over-the-counter market for credit default swaps.  Again, 
reliance on heuristics to assess the risk profiles of sellers of default swaps resulted in sellers 
taking on more risk than was optimal when these heuristics proved incapable of capturing the 
true underlying risk being shouldered by sellers of default swaps.  This moral hazard resulted in 
fragile central counterparties, like AIG, that collapsed when stressed.  Section 5 examines the 
linkages in the financial system that tied the lemons market in the securitization process to the 
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moral hazard problems of the credit default swap market.  The strength of these linkages 
accelerated financial stresses in one sector of the market and helped transmit them throughout the 
system leading to a more generalized crisis in the credit markets. 
Section 6 begins a reconsideration of our basic approach to regulation of financial 
markets in the aftermath of the collapse of credit markets.  This Article proposes a wholesale 
rethinking of our approach towards regulating financial markets.  The new approach must 
supplement our current understanding of markets and how they work and not be based on an 
ideological vision of markets. Such an approach does not presume that efficient markets will 
result from a lack of regulation.  Rather, it recognize that markets are complex institutions and 
that behavioral phenomena, as well as transaction and agencies costs can cause systemic market 
failures.  This new, more pragmatic approach recognizes that regulation must promote increased 
efficiency while at the same time improving the ability of the financial system to withstand 
shocks that are the product of inevitable systematic market failures. 
This Article recommends a number of interim steps that should be taken to address 
weaknesses identified in the securitization process and in the default swap market.   First, the 
securitization markets must be restructured to increase the reliance on covered bonds thereby 
reducing incentives for market participants to create a lemons market for such securities.  
Second, a clearinghouse structure for credit derivatives must be implemented in order to improve 
market resilience.  Additionally, the use of “synthetic” credit derivatives should be eliminated.  
Finally, this article recognizes the central role played by credit rating agencies in the 
development of financial lemons markets leading up to the recent crisis and endorses steps 
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presently being undertaken by the SEC to de-emphasize the private ordering role of those 
agencies.     
These changes, however, are secondary to the larger project of redefining the current 
approach to regulation of our financial markets.  In particular, the events of 2008 suggest that 
private ordering as a central component of the regulatory effort has largely failed to create 
resilient financial markets.  In fact, the financial markets resulting from a private ordering 
approach pursued over the past three decades have proved themselves dangerously fragile.   A 
new approach to regulating financial markets needs to be focused on restoring a balance to risk 
taking and increasing market resilience.  Redefining the regulatory approach must, however, 
begin with a recognition of the limits of private ordering strategies. 
 
Section 2:  Roots of the Financial Crisis of 2008  
Although there are many causes of the Financial Crisis of 2008, ultimately three issues lie 
at its root.  First, financial innovation and the corresponding long-term move towards 
liberalization and self-regulation of financial markets created the space for the crisis to develop.  
Second, following the collapse of the tech stock bubble and the events of 9/11, ultra low interest 
rates intended to generate a ‘soft landing’ created incentives for financial institutions and 
households to increase their borrowing.  Finally, market players convinced themselves, in spite 
of recent evidence, to the contrary that asset prices would not decline. 9  
                                                            
9 The economist Bagehot once noted that “all people are most credulous when they are most happy.”  No doubt the 
prospect of making money deadened the instincts of those who knew better. Bagehot, supra note 5 at 63.  See also 
Richard Thaler, THE WINNER’S CURSE (1992); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 2000); Daniel Kahneman, Paul 
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A. Deregulation of Financial Markets 
Innovations in finance theory set off a round of deregulation and liberalization of 
financial markets during the 1980s and 1990s.  The intellectual godfathers of this revolution in 
finance were Ronald Coase and Maurice Kendall.10   Coase suggested in a market with perfect 
information and zero transaction costs that market actors will engage in private ordering in order 
to assure efficient allocation of resources.11  Kendall, noting that stock prices appeared random, 
hypothesized that changes in prices were the result self-interested, rational actors responding to 
new, unanticipated information.12  Together, these insights began a revolution in fiancé and laid 
a foundation for deregulation of financial markets.  Indeed, Kendall’s efficient capital market 
hypothesis quickly became a truism so that by 1970 Eugene Fama could declare that “the 
evidence in support of the efficient capital market hypothesis is extensive, and … contradictory 
evidence is sparse.”13   
The power and simple elegance of market-based regulation and private ordering took 
hold during the 1970’s when governments and policymakers appeared unable to supply answers 
to the challenges of the day.14  Governments facing the duel problems of inflation and economic 
stagnation appeared incapable of providing leadership.  Price controls and other ham-handed 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Slovic and Amos Tversky, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982); and Cass R. Sunstein 
(ed.) BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (2000) (the work of behavioral economists also highlights the optimism 
bias).  
10 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960) and Maurice Kendall, The Analysis of 
Economic Time Series, Part I: Prices, 96 J. ROYAL STATISTICAL SOCIETY 11 (1953).  
11 Coase, supra, note 10. 
12 Kendall, supra, note 10.  
13 Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FINANCE 383, 416 
(1970) (although to his credit, Fama recognized that his results were strongest with respect to the weak form of the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis).   
14 Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS:  THE BATTLE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY 
(1998) at 109-111. 
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approaches to government intervention proved ineffective.15   A strong efficiency argument was 
made that governments and government regulation, in capital markets as in other areas, created 
distortions resulting in allocative inefficiencies.16   By permitting markets to govern themselves 
the result would be more efficient allocations of resources and economic growth.17  The public 
interest view of bank regulation that had dominated much of the banking industry since the 
Depression began to wane.18  The deregulatory approach that came to dominate much of the last 
quarter of the twentieth century was central to the development of capital markets.     
The process of deregulation of the 1980s and 1990s was characterized by a combination 
of regulatory action emanating from the Federal Reserve and legislation.  Formal deregulation of 
the banking sector came in 2000 via the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 2000, which repealed of the 
Glass-Steagall Act and ushered in the era of ‘broad banking.’19  The repeal of Glass-Steagall 
ended prohibitions against bank holding companies offering banking, securities, and insurance 
services.20  In fact, the act was a ratification of a process of deregulation of the banking system 
that had already been underway for some time.21   
                                                            
15 Id. at 110. 
16 Barth et al call this the ‘private interest view’ of banking regulation.  James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr. and Ross 
Levine, RETHINKING BANK REGULATION (2006) at 47-48. 
17 Yergin and Stanislaw, supra, note 14 (documenting the deregulatory shift in attitudes during the last quarter of the 
twentieth century).  Also see Alfred E. Kahn, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION (1988). 
18 Barth et al, supra, note 16. 
19 The interstate Banking Efficiency Act of 1994 permitted bank holding companies to operate branches across state 
lines.  A. Berger, R. Demsetz and Philip Strahan, The Consolidation of the Financial Services Industry: Cause, 
Consequence, and Implications for the Future, 23 J. BANKING & FIN. 135 (1999).  Also see Charles W. Calomiris, 
U.S. BANK DEREGULATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2000) at xiv-xvii. 
20 James R. Barth, R. Dan Brumbaugh Jr. and James A. Wilcox, The Repeal of Glass-Steagall and the Advent of 
Broad Banking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 191 (2000).  During the 1920s, banks, lent to stock speculators on margin.  
When the market crashed, a combination of plummeting asset values, margin calls, and bank runs then forced close 
to 4,000 banks to shut their doors.   One important aspect of the Glass-Steagall act was to separate the business of 
banking from speculation in the equity markets.   See Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz, A MONETARY 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES at 351-359. 
21 Barth et al, supra, note 19.  Also see Keith Bradsher, U.S. Proposes Letting Banks Enter New Fields, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994 (experimentation with broad banking) and see Stephen Labaton, 3 More Banks Given 
Authority to Trade Stocks, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 16. 1991 (experimentation with broad banking).  The 1998 
13 
 
For example, Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall act prohibited banking institutions from 
underwriting or otherwise dealing in securities (“bank ineligible” assets).22  This prohibition can 
be traced back to a belief by regulators that banks’ use of affiliates to engage in securities 
underwriting and dealing had been one of a series of causes of the stock bubble leading to the 
crash of 1929.23  In 1987, the Federal Reserve permitted Bank Holding Companies to apply to 
create securities affiliates that would have limited rights to underwrite and deal in securities, 
including “bank ineligible” securities, provided revenues from ineligible securities (including 
asset-backed securities and derivative transactions) did not exceed 5% of the affiliate’s 
revenue.24  In 1997, the Federal Reserve raised this limit to 25%.25  Finally, with the repeal of 
Glass-Steagall in 1999, this limit was lifted altogether thus permitting bank holding companies, 
through their subsidiaries, to engage in trading and underwriting of securities previously off 
limits.26 
The consensus opinion at the time, consistent with finance theory, was that permitting 
banks and bank holding companies to engage in ‘broad banking’ would permit these institutions 
to diversify their activities and thus “reduce BHC [bank holding company] risk and, in particular, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
merger of Travelers and Citibank was hoped to usher in the efficiencies of broad banking by permitting customers to 
get access to a financial supermarket.  Ultimately, this model has proven itself more susceptible to systemic risk than 
“narrow” banks.  Citigroup, FORM 8-K (as filed with the SEC on January 16, 2009) (announcing break up of 
Citigroup into a “good bank” (Citibank) and a “bad bank” (Citi Holdings).  This recent effort at creating a financial 
supermarket was not Citibank’s first.  In the 1920s under the leadership of Charley Mitchell then National City Bank 
attempted the same strategy with its securities and underwriting affiliate, National City Company.  See Frederick 
Lewis Allen, THE LORDS OF CREATION (1935) at 312-315. 
22 Section 20, BANKING ACT OF 1933 (P.L. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162). 
23 Glass-Steagall prohibited banks from, among other things, engaging in the underwriting and/or dealing of 
securities and also prohibited banks from holding on their books “bank ineligible” assets (securities, including 
ultimately CDO’s, other asset backed securities and derivative swaps).  This prohibition may have stemmed from 
the abusive practices of National City Bank’s National City Company, a securities affiliate, during the 1920’s.  
Allen, supra, note 21. 
24 Calomiris, supra note 19 at xiv.  
25 Id. at xv.  Barth et al, supra note 20 at 194.  Also see SECTION 103, GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT, PL 106-102 
(2000). 
26 Id.  (Pub.L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338).  Prior to the Depression, banks were permitted to engage in the trading and 
underwriting of securities through their affiliates. 
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the probability of bankruptcy.”27  Permitting banks to manage their own risk through 
diversification into broad banking would, in the abstract, result in self-interested, rational banks 
making more efficient allocations of capital across markets and market segments than would be 
possible in a more hands-on regulatory environment.28  Indeed, others pronounced an expectation 
that broad banking would create internal incentives for banks to engage in private ordering in 
order to mitigate risks and thus increase the value for shareholders.29 
In 2000 Congress also considered the question of regulation of financial derivatives.  
These products were regulated neither by the SEC nor the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission  (“CFTC”) because they were traded in “over-the-counter” in private, negotiated 
transactions.30  The lack of regulatory oversight led to questions about the enforceability of these 
contracts.31   If derivative contracts were securities, they should properly be subject to the 
regulatory jurisdiction of the SEC.  If they were futures, then the CFTC would have proper 
jurisdiction regulate their sale.  Without regulatory clarity, parties entering into these contracts 
                                                            
27 Simon Kwan and Elizabeth Laderman, quoted in Barth et al, supra note 20 at 199.   Calomiris notes that there was 
little opposition from academics to deregulation of banking activities, suggesting a consensus that Glass-Steagall 
prohibitions were inefficient.  Calomiris, supra note 19 at xvii. 
28 In fact, one result of this reform appears to have been a cultural shift within these organizations to accept, or 
pursue, more risk. The Long Demise of Glass-Steagall, FRONTLINE: THE WALL STREET FIX (May 8, 2003) available 
at www.pbs.org.(on the culture of risk in the securities industry versus the culture of protection in the banking 
industry).  Also see Gretchen Morgenson, The End of Banking as We Know It, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Jan 18, 2009 
(noting the importance of the cultural shift towards more risk on the part of banks following the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act). 
29 Randall Kroszner and Raghuram G. Rajan, Organization Structure and Credibility: Evidence from Commercial 
Bank Securities Activities Before the Glass-Steagall Act, NBER WORKING PAPER 5256 (Sept. 1995) (arguing that 
internal incentives of 1920’s banks resulted in high quality self-regulation).   
30 Anthony Faiola, Ellen Nakashima and Jill Drew, What Went Wrong, THE WASHINGTON POST, October 15, 2008 at 
A1 and see Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for 
OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L. J. 701 (1999). 
31 Faiola et al, supra note 30 and Stout, supra note 30. 
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ran the risk of running afoul of regulators or becoming subject to a regulatory skirmish.  This 
uncertainty, some believed, might stymie development of such financial products.32 
Thus, there was an impetus to provide some legal certainty for the status of such 
contracts.  In testimony before Congress, officials from the Federal Reserve, the SEC and the 
CFTC were all of the same opinion:  sophisticated investors doing transactions with 
sophisticated counterparties have sufficient ability to generate private ordering solutions in order 
to “protect themselves against fraud and unfair practices” in the trading of derivatives.33  
Regulators concluded that financial derivatives, credit default swaps in particular, should not be 
subjected to regulation.34  The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 excluded 
financial derivative products meeting certain conditions from regulatory oversight and thus 
provided parties entering into transactions with respect to such products the certainty that they 
would be enforceable.35   
With respect to the regulatory stance in both banking and financial derivatives, the 
movement over the last quarter of the twentieth century has been clear.  Regulators understood 
                                                            
32 Faiola et al, supra note 30 and Stout, supra note 30. 
33 Testimony of Patrick Parkinson, Associate Director Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System before the 
House Banking and Financial Services Committee, July 19, 2000.  Also see Testimony of Annette L. Nazareth, 
Director, Division of Market Regulation, Securities Exchange Commission before the House Banking and Financial 
Services Committee, July 19, 2000 and also C. Robert Paul, General Counsel, Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission before the House Banking and Financial Services Committee, July 19, 2000.  Also see the 
recommendations of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets Report on Over-the-Counter Derivatives 
Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act, November 1999 (U.S. Department of the Treasury).  The Report 
suggests that permitting removing regulatory impediments to the development of over-the-counter derivatives would 
lead to reduced systemic risk.   
34 Id.  Not all observers at the time were so sanguine about the ability of sophisticated market participants to fend for 
themselves without regulatory changes.  See Stout, supra note 30.  For a discussion of credit default swaps see infra 
at p [_]. 
35 COMMODITY FUTURES MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2000, HR 5660, 106th Cong. (2000).   
Sec 105(b) SWAP TRANSACTIONS …(g)Excluded Swap Transactions. – No provision of this act … shall apply to or 
govern any agreement, contract, or transaction in a commodity other than an agricultural commodity if the 
agreement, contract or transaction is  –  
(1) entered into only between persons that are eligible contract participants …  
(2) subject to individual negotiation by the parties; and  
(3) not executed or traded on a trading facility.  
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that private parties were best placed to determine the nature and the limits of the risk they were 
capable of undertaking.  By permitting financial institutions to determine their optimal size and 
scope, regulators would allow such institutions to innovate thus enjoying the benefits of risk 
reduction associated with diversification without the interference of regulators.  This was 
supposed to have the benefit of reducing systemic risk without the interference of regulators 
while at the same time providing borrowers with better access to capital at cheaper rates. 
Sophisticated investors were thought to be in the best position to protect themselves when 
engaging in over-the-counter derivative transactions.  By engaging in over-the-counter derivative 
transactions, parties could improve resilience and lower systemic risk in the financial system.    
Notwithstanding these sanguine claims, there were counter arguments available at the 
time. For example, critics of bank deregulation argued that deregulated banks would be subject 
to conflicts of interest that might have them put the interests of underwriting clients ahead of the 
investing public, leading to a collapse of confidence in the bank holding company in the event 
such conflicts resulted in low quality securities being issued to the investing public.  Critics also 
argued that banks might attempt to extend deposit protection to their securities affiliates, and 
thus creating a moral hazard leading to excessive risk taking by securities subsidiaries of banks.36 
With respect to claims that sophisticated market participants could fend for themselves in 
derivative markets, the near collapse of LTCM, a hedge fund founded by two Nobel prize 
winning economists, brought such a claim into question.  In 1999 the President’s Working Group 
on Financial Markets’ report on the collapse of LTCM regulators concluded that excessive 
leverage combined with the use of derivative instruments by a central trading partner, like 
                                                            
36 Randall Kroszner and Raghuram G. Rajan, Organization Structure and Credibility: Evidence from Commercial 
Bank Securities Activities Before the Glass-Steagall Act, NBER WORKING PAPER 5256 (Sept. 1995) (restating both 
of these arguments). 
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LTCM, had created systemic risk (i.e. risk to the entire financial system).37  Even the 
sophisticated investors at the center of LTCM were not able to effectively manage that risk.  
Notwithstanding the conclusions of the report, six months later those same regulators 
recommended Congress not subject such transactions to any oversight.38 
B. Credit 
In the context of the deregulatory environment described above, cheap credit lit the fuse.39  After 
the collapse of the stock market bubble in 2000, the Federal Reserve attempted to engineer a 
‘soft landing’ by aggressively lowering short term interest rates from 6.5% to 3.5%.40  Following 
the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, the Federal Reserve provided yet more stimulus 
by lowering rates further to 1.75%.   Finally, in 2003, the Federal Reserve lowered short term 
rates to only 1.0% and then held them there for a year.  In real terms, interest rates during this 
period were negative.41  With inflation exceeding interest rates, the Federal Reserve was in effect 
paying banks to borrow money through 2004.   
Ultra low interest rates during this period had the effect of encouraging financial 
institutions to seek out a new range of potential investment products that might provide a higher 
return for the same risk profile.  Borrowers, who might not otherwise have been in the market to 
borrow, sought credit from recently unshackled financial institutions.  These institutions made 
                                                            
37 President’s Working Group on Financial Markets Report on Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-
Term Capital Management, April 1999 (U.S. Department of the Treasury). 
38 Id. 
39 Others have already noted the importance of cheap credit in generating conditions for the recent real estate bubble.  
Among others see Charles Morris, THE TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN (2008) at 59-60. 
40 Id. Also see Jonathan Fuerbringer, The Markets: Stocks & Bonds; Investors Weed Out Thorns From Greenspan’s 
Message, THE NEW YORK TIMES, July 21, 2000.  
41 According the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the CPI in 2002 and 2003 was 2.3% and 2.7% respectively.  During 
those years, had a bank borrowed money from the Fed at between 1.00% and 1.25%, it would have made money in 
real terms simply by doing nothing.   
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relatively cheap credit available in part through new and innovative lending schemes.42  As a 
consequence the ratio of household debt to personal disposable income grew rapidly from 
approximately 90% in 1999 to almost 120% in 2005.43 
C. Housing Bubble 
Accompanying, or perhaps as a result of, both the suppression of interest rates and the 
development of new financial products a real estate bubble developed.  Despite significant 
evidence to the contrary market participants developed the view that real estate prices would not, 
or could not, decline.44  The variety of subprime mortgages marketed during the run up to the 
Financial Crisis of 2008 (including adjustable rate mortgages (“ARM”), option ARMs, Alt-A 
stated income loans, negative amortization loans, etc.) were ‘collateral dependent’ loans that 
depended on the continued appreciation of housing prices for their viability.45  By 2006, twenty 
percent of all mortgage originations were subprime loans that followed this model, and eighty 
percent of those were securitized.46  Securitization structures both fueled the growth of the real 
estate bubble and were a source of the Financial Crisis once asset price growth slowed. 
                                                            
42 See discussion of collateralized debt obligations and the securitization of lending infra at section 3. 
43 Spendthrift Nation, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO ECONOMIC LETTER, NOV. 10, 2005.  See 
discussion of adverse selection in mortgage market infra at section 3. 
44 Rating agencies exhibited an availability bias by modeling the growth in housing prices and not including the 
possibility of a nationwide decline in asset prices, noting that such a scenario had not occurred since the Great 
Depression.  Aaron Lucchetti, As Housing Boomed, Moody’s Opened Up, WALL STREET JOURNAL (April 11, 2008) 
at 1.  Notwithstanding such optimistic assumptions there was significant available evidence that real estate markets, 
even national markets, go down as well as up.   Takeo Hoshi and Anil K. Kashyap, Japan’s Financial Crisis and 
Economic Stagnation, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2004) (economic impact of Japan’s housing bubble and the collapse of 
national housing prices in Japan).  Also see Robert J. Schiller, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION (2008) at chapter 2 
(reviewing housing bubbles in US history). 
45 Gary B. Gorton, The Subprime Panic, NBER WORKING PAPER 14398 (October 2008) at 6 (discussing the 
optionality of subprime lending).  Also see infra at note 50. 
46 Id. at 6.  Also see Scott Frame, Andreas Lehnert, and Ned Prescott, A Snapshot of Mortgage Conditions with an 
Emphasis on Subprime Mortgage Performance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, August 27, 2008 (subprime 
mortgages and growth).  For discussion of securitization process see infra at Section 3. 
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ARM’s for subprime borrowers were a principal means by which many borrowers 
entered the housing market during the bubble.47  The key design aspects of these ARM loans are 
the short-term nature of the initial low rate, the step-up in rates when the mortgage is ‘reset’ at 
the end of the initial teaser period, and finally the prepayment penalty.48  The step-up in rates 
combined with prepayment penalties effectively creates a valuable option for lenders seeking to 
provide credit to risky borrowers.49  The anticipated increase in borrower’s equity permits 
borrowers to roll over the initial loan into a new loan with the loan servicer.50  Provided housing 
prices continue to increase, this cycle created an option for the loan servicer.  Of course, the 
downside of this option is that if real estate values do not increase, the servicer can refuse to 
refinance – effectively forcing the borrower into foreclosure.   
 
Figure 1: Case‐Schiller Composite Index51
The Case-Schiller historical index of national home 
prices highlights the trends in real-estate values 
since 1988.  The rapid growth in real estate values 
begins in 1998, coincident with the tech stock 
bubble, and then accelerates in 2001 as the Federal 
Reserve aggressively lowered interest rates.  Prices 
end their climb in 2006, approximately two years 
after the Federal Reserve began raising interest 
rates.   
                                                            
47 Frame et al, supra note 46 (subprime mortgages and growth). 
48 Gorton, supra note 45 at 5 and Anand K. Bhattacharya, Prepayment Penalty Mortgage-Backed Securities, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (2001) at 77-81 (discussing the structure and incentives of the 
prepayment penalty). 
49 Gorton, supra note 45 at 5.  If the value of the collateral increases during the initial period, lenders have an 
incentive to waive prepayment penalties and refinance the borrower’s loan.   On the other hand, if the value of the 
collateral goes down or the borrower turns out to be a poor risk, the combination of the step-up of rates and the 
prepayment penalties can force the borrower into foreclosure and thus limit downside losses for lenders.  
Bhattacharya discounts this as a motivation for engaging in these kinds of loans. See Bhattacharya supra note 48 at 
80. 
50 Reliance on “collateral dependent” mortgages during the recent housing bubble is in contravention to good 
banking practices.  See Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, Federal Reserve Board, BANK HOLDING 
COMPANY SUPERVISION MANUAL (June 1997) at §3070.3.1.2. 
51 Standard & Poor’s Press Release, February 24, 2009 available at  
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/CSHomePrice_Release_022445.pdf. 
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During the period following the collapse of the tech bubble, real estate values grew 
quickly, well above historical averages.52    Bubble economies often work in unexpected ways.  
Expectations of future price increases can feed on themselves during a bubble such that it 
becomes rational – even for an investor who recognizes that asset price values are unsustainable 
- to participate at least temporarily.53  However, while the mechanics of building up a bubble are 
generally understood, what is less easily explained is how among market participants convinced 
themselves that they had entered a ‘new era’ of housing finance.54  In 2004 – even as he was 
beginning to raise interest rates – Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan endorsed the 
subprime housing bubble when in a speech before the National Credit Union Association he 
noted that fixed rate mortgages appeared “unduly expensive” and that consumers “might benefit 
if lenders provided greater mortgage product alternatives to the traditional fixed rate 
mortgage.”55   
The subprime securitization structure required stable or a downward trend in interest rates 
to sustain itself.56  When the Fed began to raise interest rates in 2004-5, demand for subprime 
borrowing cooled leading to a decline in real estate prices.  Declines in real estate prices had the 
double effect of reducing incentives for servicers to refinance subprime borrowers as the fixed 
                                                            
52 Schiller, supra note 44. 
53 Peter Garber, FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES (2000) at 5 (describing herding and the ‘rationality’ of bubbles). 
54 “New Era” claims, even by sophisticated observers, are common during bubble periods.  During the period prior 
to the stock market  Crash of 1929, the “new era” of stock investing had, according to well-known Yale economist 
Irving Fisher, led prices to a higher, sustainable plateau.  Frederick Lewis Allen, ONLY YESTERDAY (1931) at 323. 
55 Alan Greenspan, Remarks before the Credit Union National Association 2004 Governmental Affairs Committee 
(February 23, 2004)(arguing that the insurance borrowers were paying for certainty was too expensive and that 
individual borrowers could likely more cheaply manage their interest rate risk in other ways while holding an 
adjustable rate mortgage).  Of course, in hindsight, Mr. Greenspan’s admission that he did not fully understand the 
subprime market until sometime in 2005 provides some explanation of his position.  See Andrew Ross Sorkin, 
Dealbook: Greenspan Says He Was Mystified by Subprime Market, THE NEW YORK TIMES, February 12, 2009. 
56 For discussion of dynamics of securitization of subprime lending see infra Section 3 below and Gorton, supra 
note 45.  
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terms of those mortgages reset to variable rates.  As marginal borrowers, now forced to pay 
higher rates, began to default on their mortgages, the air quickly came out of the real estate 
bubble as subprime borrowers were forced into foreclosure.57 
Section 3.  Securitization Process Creates Adverse Selection Bias 
 
Adverse selection can occur when a seller has more information ex ante about the 
underlying quality of its assets than the buyer and where the buyer relies on a heuristic or other 
‘independent marker’ in order to make an assessment about the average quality of the assets 
being offered by the seller.58  Where that is true, sellers who know that the true value of their 
assets is greater than that indicated by the independent marker will withhold their assets from the 
market.  On the other hand, sellers who know the true value of the asset they are offering for sale 
is less than that indicated by the marker will stay in the market.  Consequently, where there is an 
asymmetry of information with respect to the true value of an asset, the market will be made up 
of lower than average quality assets.59    In the extreme, the potential for adverse selection can 
lead to still-born markets or market crashes.  Following the Financial Crisis of 2008, it has 
become clear some of financial innovations central to development of capital markets over the 
past three decades led to the development of a financial lemons market.    
Prior to the development of securitization and structured finance techniques, debt 
financing and risk was highly idiosyncratic.  The only way a local banker could manage risk 
associated with her credit investments was to develop relationships with potential borrowers that 
                                                            
57 The introduction of synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDO’s) had the effect of multiplying potential losses 
well beyond the size of the stock of real estate.  See discussion of CDO’s and synthetic CDO’s infra Section 3 and 
Section 4. 
58 Akerlof, supra note 4. 
59 Id. 
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elicited private information about the potential of these potential borrowers to repay.  Only by 
generating private information about potential borrowers could a banker adequately manage 
risk.60  The commoditization of debt through securitization and structured finance has permitted 
investors to diversify away idiosyncratic risk.  On the other hand, securitization and structured 
finance have attenuated the once-strong link between borrowers and the ultimate investors thus 
creating incentives for originators of financing products to engage in opportunistic behavior, 
leading to a lemons market.61 
  Securitization or the commoditization of debt financing turned the sensibility of old 
bankers on its head by attenuating the link between borrower and lender.62  In the securitization 
mode, private information takes a back seat to heuristics such as credit scores which tend to 
guide underwriting decisions.63  With the “originate-to-distribute” business model, loan 
originators have very little interest in developing long-term relationships with potential 
borrowers.64  Rather, loan originators make their money in just two ways, both of which can be 
characterized as one-off transactions.  First, they make a commission on every loan they 
underwrite. 65  Second, they make a profit on every loan they sell on to sponsors of investment 
                                                            
60 J.P. Morgan summed up this approach to finance when, in response to a question by Samuel Untermeyer during 
the 1912 Pujo Committee (or Money Trust) Hearings whether commercial credit was allocated based primarily upon 
profit potential, he answered, “No sir; the first thing is character.” Quoted in Jean Strouse, MORGAN: AMERICAN 
FINANCIER (2000) at 13. 
61 Economists have recognized this problem for many years.  Gary Gorton and G. Pennacchi, Banking and Loan 
Sales: Marketing Nonmarketable Assets, 35 J. MONETARY ECON. 389, 391 (1995) (noting that loan sales should 
result in less ex ante monitoring) and see Bernanke, supra note 5 at 142 (noting that financial markets are 
susceptible to the lemons market problem).   Engel and McCoy also note that securitization creates incentives for the 
development of a lemons market in the subprime mortgage market.  See Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy, 
Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2072 (2007). 
62 On the other hand, Hill notes that securitization permits borrowers who might otherwise be ‘lemons’ overcome 
the lemons problem.  Claire Hill, Securitization:  A Low Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U.L.Q. 1061 (1996).     
63 Credit scores were the “independent marker” required for the development of a financial lemons market. Akerlof, 
supra note 4. 
64 Annand K. Bhattaharya, Frank Fabozzi, and S. Esther Chang, Overview of the Mortgage Market in HANDBOOK OF 
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (Frank Fabozzi, ed) at 4 (describing the “originate-to-distribute” model).  
65 Id.  
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pools for mortgage-backed securities.66  Originators sell whole loans to these investment pools 
and typically maintain no ongoing obligation with respect to the performance of such loans.67   
Consequently, originating banks have little incentive to focus on the long-term viability of loans 
they sell on to investment pools.  After selling off a loan, the originating bank is able to use the 
cash generated by that sale to originate more loans.68  Thus, in the abstract the securitization 
process makes it possible for banks to lend more than under the more traditional lend-and-hold 
model and can lead to more economic growth. 
The residential mortgage backed security (“RMBS”) is the traditional securitization 
vehicle.  In an RMBS structure, an investment pool, legally separate from the mortgage 
originator or sponsor, holds anywhere from 1,000 to 10,000 mortgages.  The RMBS structure is 
designed as a “pass-through” conduit.69  As a pass-through, the structure simply distributes pro 
rata all the proceeds it receives periodically from mortgage servicers.  The pro rata distribution 
structure results in a lumpy payment schedule because all mortgage borrowers are holding an 
implicit put option on their loans.70  When interest rates decline, the borrower has an incentive to 
pre-pay the loan and refinance at a lower interest rate (a “put option”).  Pass-through conduits are 
also subject to seasonality.  In summer months, when people tend to move, an RMBS might 
                                                            
66 Id.  
67 For example, originators maintain no ongoing obligation or credit risk beyond a 60 day window with respect to 
representations and warranties for any loan contributed to one of Goldman Sachs’ pools.  Should a loan sold to one 
of these pools default after 61 days, the originator has not obligation to take such a loan back.  See GSAA Home 
Equity Trust 2004-6, FORM 424B5 (filed with the SEC on July 29, 2004); GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-3, FORM 
424B5 (filed with the SEC on February 23, 2005); GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-6, FORM 424B5 (filed with the 
SEC on May 1, 2006); and GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-5F, FORM 424B5 (filed with the SEC on December 28, 
2007).   
68 If a bank retains a portion of the credit risk of a loan that is otherwise sold to a securitization pool, bank regulators 
may not give the selling bank any relief in its regulatory capital requirements.  On the other hand, if an originating 
bank sells its entire interest in the loan and bears none of the credit risk, then it can receive relief from regulatory 
capital requirements. See D. Staehle and C. Cummings The Supervision of Credit Derivative Activities of Banking 
Organizations, in HANDBOOK OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES (J. Francis, J. Frost and J. Whitaker, eds.) at 293. 
69  Laurie S. Goodman and Frank J. Fabozzi, COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS (2002) at 77 (for description of 
pass-through entities). 
70 This applies only to loans that do not include prepayment penalties. 
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expect to see a large number of prepayments as borrowers sell their homes and move.  For these 
reasons, the RMBS was never a popular investment vehicle with investors in search of 
predictable returns.71    
The collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”) was created, in part, to attempt to address the 
problems of optionality and seasonality in mortgage-backed securities.  In its first iteration the 
CDO took an RMBS security and simply prioritized, or tranched, the payments.72  In a CDO 
structure, the proceeds of the CDO pool are not simply passed though pro rata to bond holders.  
Rather, the CDO sponsor assembles an asset pool that may include individual mortgages or as 
many as 45 RMBS.73  The payments from this pool are then prioritized in senior and junior 
tranches in a process called subordination.74  By ensuring that senior tranches are paid before any 
junior tranches are paid, the CDO sponsor assured investors in senior tranches of a steady cash 
stream from the pool.  The most senior tranche is always rated AAA, the highest investment 
grade rating available.75  Investors in the most junior tranche, the equity tranche, accept the first 
                                                            
71 The seasonality and optionality of mortgages is well known.  See Dale Westhoff and V.S. Srinvasan  The Next 
Generation of Prepayment Models to Value Non-Agency MBS in THE HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE-BACKED 
SECURITIES (Frank Fabozzi, ed) at 429-435.  
72 Joel W. Brown and William M. Wadden, Mortgage Credit Analysis in THE HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE-BACKED 
SECURITIES (Frank Fabozzi, ed) at 315. 
73 Goldman Sachs Mortgage Securities Company provides a representative sample of the kinds of CDOs that were 
generated during the period up through 2007.  See GSAA Home Equity Trust 2004-6, FORM 424B5 (filed with the 
SEC on July 29, 2004); GSAA Home Equity Trust 2005-3, FORM 424B5 (filed with the SEC on February 23, 2005); 
GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-6, FORM 424B5 (filed with the SEC on May 1, 2006); and GSR Mortgage Loan 
Trust 2007-5F, FORM 424B5 (filed with the SEC on December 28, 2007).  Frank Fabozzi, Chuck Ramsey and 
Michael Marz, THE HANDBOOK OF NONAGENCY MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (2000) at 23.  
74 Frank Fabozzi, et al, Nonagency CMOs, in THE HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (F. Fabozzi, ed.) 
(2001) at 269-270 (for a discussion of subordination).  
75 The most senior tranche in a CDO is always rated AAA.  This assumes that the probability of repayment of the 
assets making up the collateral of the pool is not correlated, such that the likelihood of all, or a significant number of 
borrowers defaulting at the same time, is low.   Given the structure of payments flowing from the CDO pool the 
discussion that occurs among rating agencies and the CDO sponsors is not about whether a senior tranche has a 
AAA rating, but rather how large or small such a tranche will be.  GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-6, FORM 424B5 
(filed with the SEC on May 1, 2006)(example of subordinated payment structure).  Senior tranches from the period 
2005-2006 could be large.  For example, in the GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-6 CDO 93% of the $464.5 million 
in bonds issued as part of that offering were rated AAA.  This offering included more than 2,500 fixed-rate Alt-A 
mortgages loans with borrower average FICO scores of only 620.  GSAA Mortgage Securities Corp, FORM 424B5 
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losses from the pool.76  The most important aspect of the CDO structure is that through 
subordination of cash flows, the sponsor is able to produce a security, has a higher credit rating 
than the average credit rating of the underlying assets in the CDO pool.   The waterfall payment 
structure ensures that less senior bonds suffer the first losses, thus getting around the problems of 
seasonality, optionality and credit risk that are typical in a pass-through structure.77   
 
 
 
Figure 2: Collateralized Debt Obligation Payment Waterfall78
The collateralized debt obligation relies on financial 
engineering to generate stable and predictable 
revenues from less than high quality collateral.  By 
prioritizing payments into the CDO pool, the sponsor of 
a CDO can ensure that some claims, those rated AAA, 
have very high likelihoods of repayment.  By assembling 
multiple low‐quality pools of obligations from CDO’s 
sponsors can create a similar waterfall payment 
structure and thus generate a AAA obligation from a 
pool of low quality mortgages – the CDO‐Squared.  With 
this waterfall payment structure, so long as the risks of 
default for the loans comprising the pool are 
uncorrelated, the risk of repayment for highest rated 
tranche is extremely low. 
 
 
 By prioritizing the payments the sponsor can transform a pool of the lowest 
quality loans into a high quality security.  For example, the “CDO-Squared” structure can create 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
(as filed with the SEC on May 1, 2006) at S-34.   Although rating agencies and sponsors assumed low default 
correlations for the assets backing these kinds of CDO’s in hindsight, they appear to have been wrong as the default 
correlations turned out to be quite high. 
76 GSAA Mortgage Securities Corp, FORM 424B5 (filed with the SEC on May 1, 2006). 
77 See GSAA Home Equity Trust 2004-6, FORM 424B5 (filed with the SEC on July 29, 2004); GSAA Home Equity 
Trust 2005-3, FORM 424B5 (filed with the SEC on February 23, 2005); GSAA Home Equity Trust 2006-6, FORM 
424B5 (filed with the SEC on May 1, 2006); and GSR Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-5F, FORM 424B5 (filed with the 
SEC on December 28, 2007).   
78 Goodman and Fabozzi, supra note 69 at 95-96 (describing the waterfall payment structure of CDO’s). 
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a AAA security out of an asset pool backed by only BBB bonds through prioritizing payments.79   
In the typical CDO, the high risk BBB and Equity tranches are the most troublesome.  Due to the 
risk involved in holding such securities, there may be few buyers.  In the vernacular of the 
industry, these tranches are known as the “B-piece” or toxic assets.80  By assembling blocs of B-
piece assets into a new CDO, one can structure cash flows to create a AAA security.81 This is 
possible because as long as the default risk of the assets in a pool is not correlated there will 
always be cash flow through the entity.  Although not all subprime borrowers will be able to 
repay their loans, some will.  The cash flow from those good risks pays the AAA claims.  Lower 
rated securities in the CDO-Squared structure, of course must accept more risk.   
In the early stages of the real estate bubble, the number of high quality borrowers in the 
marketplace was relatively high.  So long as interest rates remained low or on a downward 
trajectory and asset values remain inflated, there would be a supply of quality borrowers looking 
for financing and refinancing.  Rising real estate prices and a functional refinancing market for 
subprime borrowers meant that historically fewer marginal borrowers defaulted on their loans.82  
Consequently, during the run-up in real estate prices, the CDO-Squared structure was an ideal 
investment:  it provided high yields at low levels of risk.    
However, when interest rates began to climb in 2005/2006 at the tail end of the bubble, 
fewer high quality borrowers entered the marketplace and standards for approving loans to low 
                                                            
79 Nomura Fixed Income Research, CDOs-Squared Demystified (February 4, 2005) (on file with author). 
80 Tax rules initially required sponsors of CDO’s to retain these toxic assets.  However, the creation of real estate 
mortgage investment conduits (“REMIC”) as special purpose vehicles permitted sponsors to dispose of these assets.  
Initially, there was not a market for these assets. However, the CDO-squared structure changed that.   SEC. 860 
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, Taxation of REMIC’s.  Eric Bruskin, Anthony B. Sanders, and David Sykes, The 
Nonagency Mortgage Market: Background and Overview, in NONAGENCY MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (Frank 
J. Fabozzi, et al, eds.) (2000) at 10. 
81 Nomura, supra note 78. 
82 Bruskin et al, supra note 80 at 15 (describing these trends). 
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quality borrowers dropped.83  Ordinarily, one might expect a lender to recognize a downturn and 
then withhold underwriting approvals from poor risks when asset prices are likely to decline.  
The front-loaded structure of incentives in the originate-to-distribute model, however, induced 
originators of mortgages to lower lending standards and continue to underwrite mortgages 
precisely when they should have been cutting back.   
Empirical studies on subprime mortgages suggest that where the originating institutions 
securitized mortgages those mortgages tended to be more likely to default.84  Where 
securitization was common, mortgage originators, for their part, appear to have relied heavily on 
“hard” information, like FICO scores, rather than expend resources in collecting soft information 
about a potential borrower’s likelihood of default.  Others note that ‘hard’ information does not 
capture important ‘soft’ information about a potential borrower’s likelihood to default, like the 
possibility of losing a job or upcoming expenses not adequately revealed by expense reports.  
This is the type of information routinely developed in the pre-securitization era of relationship 
                                                            
83 There is evidence that underwriting standards declined during this period.  Notwithstanding the fact that the 
Federal Reserve Board’s Bank Holding Company Supervision guidelines indicate without reservation that certain 
types of loans (subprime, Alt-A, high loan-to-value loans, piggyback loans, etc) are demonstrably more risky than 
thirty year prime loans, rating agencies nevertheless provided CDO’s with these loans AAA ratings.  In particular, 
the Federal Reserve warned against banks making “collateral dependent” loans (i.e. loans that depend on an increase 
in home prices or subsequent refinancing in order to make them viable), there was an explosion in the underwriting 
of collateral backed loans (subprime, Alt-A, Interest Only, Option ARM).  See Christopher Mayer, Karen Pence, and 
Shane M. Sutherland, The Rise in Mortgage Defaults, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 27 (2009).  Division of Banking 
Supervision and Regulation, Federal Reserve Board, Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual (June 1997) at 
§3070.3.1.2 (for mortgage standards).  Also see Aaron Lucchetti and Serena Ng, How Ratings Firms’ Calls Fueled 
Subprime Mess, WALL STREET JOURNAL, August 15, 2007 (noting that S&P concluded that piggyback and other 
high risk loans did not have a high risk of default for purposes of rating CDO products); also see Consolidated Class 
Action Complaint, In Re Washington Mutual, Inc. Securities Litigation Case No. C08-387-MJP (US District Court 
W. District of Washington at Seattle) at 115, 129 (One former employee of Washington Mutual noted underwriting 
standards fell so low   that “if you  had a pulse, WaMu would give you a loan.’ [p115]  When WaMu originated a 
loan with a low teaser rate, it approved the loan based upon the borrower’s ability to repay the loan at the teaser rate 
rather than the fully indexed rate. [p129]). ] For additional examples of lax underwriting standards see Kristopher 
Gerardi, Andreas Lehnert, Sahe Sherlund and Paul Willien, Making Sense of the Subprime Crisis, BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, available at ssrn.com (September 2008) at 7-10. 
84 Benjamin J. Keys, Tanmoy Mukherjee, Amit Seru, and Vikram Vig, Did Securitization Lead to Lax screening? 
Evidence From Subprime Loans, available at ssrn.com (April 2008) at 22 (observing that a doubling of 
securitization volume is associated with about a 20% increase in defaults). 
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banking.  The process of securitization forces originators to standardize information, thus making 
it difficult if not impossible to convey soft information to investors.85  The true quality of these 
loans is unobservable to investors at the end of the asset stream.86 The costs of direct 
investigation of the quality of the assets backing the pool in such cases are prohibitive.    
Other empirical studies of bank holding companies following the repeal of the Glass-
Steagall Act conclude that banks engaging in ‘broad banking’ were highly diversified in their 
lending and holding of mortgage-backed assets, but such with such holdings these banks behaved 
more like uninformed investors than banks with less diversified lending portfolios.87  Less 
diversified banks tended not to securitize mortgages that they originated but generated more 
private information about their borrowers.88  The securitization process thus generates structural 
information asymmetries that result in uninformed lending.  These asymmetries may be 
impossible to eliminate or reduce, and in the face of this complexity, large bank holding 
companies retreated to heuristics to assist in their decisionmaking.89   
                                                            
85 Rajan et al posit that ‘hard’ information like a FICO score does not capture important ‘soft’ information about a 
potential borrower’s likelihood to default, like the possibility of losing a job or upcoming expenses not adequately 
revealed by expense reports.  The process of securitization forces originators to standardize information, thus 
making it difficult to convey soft information to investors.  This reduces the incentive for originators to collect such 
information.  Yday Rajan, Amit Seru, & Vikrant Vig, The Failure of Models That Predict Failure: Distance, 
Incentives and Defaults, available at ssrn.com (October 2008) at 12-13. 
86 Indeed, prospectuses used to market CDOs to sophisticated investors do not contain more than summary 
information about the loans in the loan pool GSAA Home Equity Trust 2004-6, FORM 424B5 (filed with the SEC on 
July 29, 2004);  Although certain “hard” data is made available to rating agencies prior to the offering.  SEC Staff 
Report, SUMMARY OF EXAMINATION OF SELECTING RATING AGENCIES, July 2008. 
87 Elena Loutskina and Philip E. Strahan, Informed and Uninformed Investment in Housing: The Downside of 
Diversification (August 2008) available on ssrn.com. 
88 Id. 
89 Tversky and Kahneman, supra note 9 at 11.  Also see Engel and McCoy, supra note 61at 2087-2090 (also noting 
a retreat to heuristics by investors).  In addition, because many institutional investors pursue diversification 
strategies, their goal is to ensure that the portfolio they hold is diversified and replicates the performance of some 
benchmark index over time.  Rather than the performance of any individual component, the investor is more 
concerned with the performance of her portfolio of investments, of which the proposed CDO is only one small 
component.  The implication being that the need to diversify can swamp the incentives to investigate the true value 
of the underlying assets in any given CDO pool.  In pooling unrelated loans investors are able to reduce the 
idiosyncratic risks associated with the pool.   The actual character of any individual borrower in a pool of 
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The most common heuristic is the credit rating issued by one of a number of Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (“NRSRO”).  NRSRO’s through their use of letter-
grade ratings provide an accessible tool for investors attempting to weigh investment options in 
different securities.  Letter-grade ratings generated by the NRSRO’s provide potential buyers of 
bond issues with the ‘independent marker’ necessary for the development of a financial lemons 
market.  These ratings provide potential investors with guidance relating to the relative quality of 
a bond.90  Investors relied on these letter-grade ratings to replace their own due diligence with 
respect to complex financial products.91  If one understands rating agencies as playing the role of 
“reputational intermediary,” then one expects that rating agencies will have an incentive to 
carefully investigate the quality of the underlying assets because incorrect assessments will be 
costly to rating agencies.92  A faithful reputational intermediary will be aggressive in seeking out 
information and will be hesitant to put its valuable reputation and future business prospects at 
risk for little by way of benefit.93  Consequently, rating agencies should be expected to provide 
potential buyers of bond issues with valuable and accurate information regarding the relative 
likelihood of default.     
                                                                                                                                                                                               
uncorrelated loans becomes irrelevant.  Provided the pool of loans to be securitized is sufficiently diversified, the 
idiosyncratic risk attached to each borrower becomes less important provided the risks are all uncorrelated.  Richard 
A. Brealey and Stewart C. Myers, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (2000) at 187. 
90 Rating agencies argue that it does much less than this: that it simply provides a statistical probability of default 
and is not meant to indicate the actual performance of the rated security.  For discussion of the function of rating 
agencies see, among others, John C. Coffee, GATEKEEPERS (2006) chapter 8 and Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the 
Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 491 (2001). 
91 “A lot of institutional investors bought these securities substantially bases on their rating, in part because this 
market has become so complex.”  See Lucchetti and Ng, supra note 83.  Also see John Plender, Error-Laden 
Machine, FINANCIAL TIMES (March 3, 2009) at 8.  For additional evidence that investors rely on ratings rather than 
conduct their own due diligence, one need only examine the offering memorandum of GSAA Home Equity Trust 
2006-6.  One of the prominent risk factors notes that increased use of non-traditional mortgages might have the 
effect of permitting borrowers who might otherwise not be able to afford their homes to purchase them.  In effect, 
this factor warned that borrowers might be overleveraged and unable to make repayments.  GSAA Mortgage 
Securities Corp, FORM 424B5 (as filed with the SEC on May 1, 2006) at S-34.  
92 Hill makes this argument.  Claire Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 43 (2004).  
93 Id. 
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 On the other hand, if one understands rating agencies to be distributors of the “regulatory 
licenses” required to issue debt as argued by Professor Frank Partnoy, then it becomes easier to 
envision how the presence of rating agencies would not reduce information asymmetries for 
investors with respect to the underlying pool of assets.94  Many purchasers of bonds and other 
debt instruments are limited in the type and quality of instruments they may purchase by 
regulation.95  To the extent that regulatory bodies generate demand for ratings while limiting the 
ability of private actors to enter the ratings business, regulatory action creates valuable licenses 
that empower rating agencies.96  Where this dynamic dominates, the value of maintaining a 
reputation is less than the value of the regulatory license, leading to a decline in reputational 
intermediation function and a decline in the value of information generated by a rating.   Such a 
dynamic is exacerbated when financial sponsors of transactions that the NRSROs are paid to rate 
are few and are thus able to generate competitive pressures among NRSROs.97 
                                                            
94 Prof. Partnoy is a critic of the reputational view of rating agencies and argues powerfully that the primary function 
of rating agencies is to provide “regulatory licenses.”  See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial 
Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 620, 681 (1999) and Partnoy supra 
note 90. Also see Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Rating Agencies, University of San Diego Law and Economics 
Research Paper, No. 20, October 5, 2001 at 1 (arguing that there is evidence that rating agency reports supply little, 
if any, new information of value).   
95 For example, the Commonwealth of Virginia’s General Account investment guidelines permit investments of the 
state’s funds in asset-backed securities that are “rated AAA by at least two nationally recognized rating agencies 
(one of which must be either Moody’s Investors Service or Stand & Poor’s.”  General Account Investment 
Guidelines, Department of the Treasury, Commonwealth of Virginia, July 1, 2005 at 4 (on file with author).  The 
Wisconsin State Investment Fund limits its exposure to with respect to mortgage-backed securities by reference to 
size of holdings for each available rating from a national rating agency.  State of Wisconsin Investment Board 
Investment Guidelines (on file with author) at 2.    Also see Partnoy, supra note 94 at 698-701. 
96 Partnoy, supra note 94 at 698-701. 
97 The dynamic with respect to corporate bonds and bonds issued in connection with structured finance (e.g. asset 
backed securities) differs ways that have important incentive effects.  There are at least 60,000 different issuers of 
corporate bonds.  The influence that any one corporate issuer has on rating agencies is insignificant.  Consequently, 
with respect to corporate issuers of bonds, there is no reason to believe that rating agencies are unduly influenced by 
corporate pressure.  See Coffee, supra note 90 at Chapter 8.  Structured finance bonds, on the other hand present a 
different calculation.  With respect to structured finance bonds, there are a relatively small number of underwriters, 
concentrated among the investment banks, for thousands of issues. The Lehman Brothers investment bank, for 
example, securitized $146 billion and $133 billion worth of residential mortgage loans in 2006 and 2005 
respectively.  Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Form 10-K (filed with the SEC on February 13, 2007) at p65.  
Combined with competition among raters, the prospect of retaining repeat business from the investment banks can 
cause incentives to skew away from independence and in favor of a regulatory licensing approach.  Aaron Lucchetti, 
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With the benefit of hindsight, one can reasonably conclude that the reputational 
intermediary/regulatory licensing debate has been conclusively decided in favor of regulatory 
licensing.  Notwithstanding the empirically-oriented approach NRSRO’s took to justify each of 
their rating decisions, they systematically underestimated the likelihood of default of mortgage-
backed securities.98   Consequently, issuers, safe in the knowledge that they would receive a 
AAA rating for their structured finance products, permitted pools to become infected with low 
quality assets that were not entirely reflected in the rating observed by buyers, thus generating a 
financial lemons market.  The failure of the NRSRO’s to act as faithful reputational 
intermediaries permitted their ratings to act as independent markers in the development of a 
financial lemons market.  
While ratings are ubiquitous in debt markets, they also played a central role in the 
development of the default swaps for CDO’s.  Securitization vehicles with pools of government 
agency guaranteed loans receive the highest rating possible on the understanding that US 
government backing ensures these bonds will not be permitted to default.99   In order for 
securitization pools made up of nonconforming and subprime loans to be marketable to a large 
number of potential buyers, they also require an investment grade rating (consistent with the 
regulatory license view of rating agency function).  Vehicles with non-agency pools can secure 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
As Housing Boomed, Moody’s Opened Up, WALL STREET JOURNAL (April 11, 2008) at 1 (describing the changes in 
incentives as they relate to structured finance products).  Staff Report, Securities and Exchange Commission, 
SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATION OF SELECT CREDIT RATING 
AGENCIES (July 2008) at 25-26 (noting that rating agencies placed business consideration above rating independence 
in the structured finance segment). 
98 There is some discussion that the models relied upon by the rating agencies were limited in that they did not 
include previous periods of significant declines in housing prices.  Rajan et al, supra note 85 at 12-13.  Rating 
agencies were complicit in this breakdown.  For example – by granting AAA ratings to CDOs backed by “collateral 
dependent” mortgages, the rating agencies were making bets that the value of real estate would not decline during 
the period of the CDO’s life.  See Lucchetti and Ng, supra note 83.  It appears that that NRSRO’s fell victim to an 
availability bias when they neglected to model potential declines in real estate asset values.  
99 Goodman and Fabozzi, supra note 69 at 75. 
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an investment grade rating only by providing credit enhancement.  Credit enhancement can be 
accomplished internally, through subordination and overcollateralization.100  Alternatively, 
sponsors can rely on external credit enhancement through reliance on credit default swaps sold 
by insurance companies, like American International Group, Ambac Financial Group, Inc., and 
MBIA Inc. among others.101  In a transaction relying on external credit enhancement, the party 
writing the default swap in effect is lending out its investment grade rating to the issuer of the 
bonds or the purchaser of the security.102  Consequently, the key determinant of the 
creditworthiness of the bond issue becomes the quantity and quality of the credit enhancement 
and not the collateral backing the bonds.   In the extreme case, the presence of external credit 
enhancement (like a government agency guarantee or a default swap written by a AAA rated 
insurance company) can become a proxy for a rating agency’s due diligence.  With the 
availability of diligence proxies, the impetus on NRSRO to be rigorous in their assessment of 
risks related to the CDO issues declines consistent with the regulatory licensing interpretation.  
The combination of factors described above led to the development of a financial lemons 
market.  The originate-to-distribute model attenuated incentives for mortgage originators to look 
beyond a 90-day performance window for borrowers.  The inability, due to complexity and 
opaqueness of the CDO vehicle made it difficult for potential investors to know the true value of 
the underlying assets backing the CDO.  Independent markers (ratings) provided by the NRSRO 
                                                            
100 Overcollateralization requires the sponsor of the CDO to commit more assets to securitization pool than there are 
liabilities. Provided the underlying assets are sufficiently diversified and their default risk is not correlated, 
overcollateralization can be an effective strategy.  On the other hand, if defaults across the asset class are correlated, 
which they turned out to be in recent years, then overcollateralization is less likely to be sufficient to protect against 
default.   Id. at 87.   
101 For a discussion of credit default swaps see infra at Section 4. 
102 Although a sponsor may not always rely on a credit default swap, a bond purchaser may nevertheless purchase a 
default swap contract and in that way engage in a form of regulatory private ordering.  European banks purchased 
default swaps from AIG in order to gain access to the higher yields associated with riskier investments while still 
meeting their regulatory obligations to invest in only relatively safe vehicles.  See discussion of AIG’s sales of 
default swaps infra at Section 4.  
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failed to reflect the true value of the underlying assets.  Together this factors induced adverse 
selection and the creation of a lemons market for mortgage-backed securities.103   
The rapid rise in defaults and the relatively poor performance of securitized loans during 
this period is evidence of the development of the lemons market.104  The number of subprime 
and stated income (Alt-A) loans grew rapidly during the first half of this decade.  In 2003, 1.1 
million subprime and 304,000 Alt-A loans were originated in 2003.   By 2005, those numbers 
rose to 1.9 million and 1.1 million, respectively.105  Many of these loans were securitized. 
According to the Federal Reserve Board, as of September 2008, the percentage of subprime 
mortgages in trouble or already in foreclosure was well above 30% in most states.106  Others 
observe that by the third quarter of 2008, that the percentage of seriously delinquent loans surged 
to 5.2%.107   TransUnion estimates that in 2009, more than 7% of all mortgages will be in trouble 
(> 60 days past due).108  This is the highest rate that TransUnion has ever recorded suggesting 
that the quality of the overall mortgage pool is low.109  Although the CDO structure was intended 
to be resistant to risk of default, the poor quality of the underlying collateral is, in fact, so low 
that according to one estimate, 47% of all CDO’s originated since 2002 have experienced a 
                                                            
103 This result was predictable. See Leland and Pyle supra note 4 at 371.  
104 Ambac Financial conducted a survey of 1,486 loans in a CDO sponsored by Bear Stearns and found that 89% of 
them breached one more of the representations related to adequacy of borrower income, employment, assets, and 
intention to occupy the purchased home.  See Complaint, AMBAC Assurance Corporation v. EMC Mortgage 
Corporation, US District Court, Southern District of New York (Nov 5, 2008).  It is worth noting that Ambac did 
this investigation ex post and not ex ante, raising the question why AMBAC agreed to sell default swaps against 
collateral that it had not fully investigated.  
105 Christopher Mayer, Karen Pence, and Shane M. Sutherland, The Rise in Mortgage Defaults, 23, J. ECON. PERSP. 
27, 28 (2009). 
106 In Florida and California the percentage of subprime mortgages in trouble (more than 30 days behind) or in 
foreclosure was 47.2% and 36.9% respectively by September 2008.  With respect to Alt-A mortgages in Florida and 
California the percentage of mortgages in trouble or already in foreclosure was only 28.6% and 20.2% respectively.  
The lower problem rates for Alt-A loans is likely a fact that fewer of them had yet to reset at higher rates as of 
September 2008.  New York Federal Reserve Board Subprime data available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/regional/subprime.html.   
107 Mayer et al, supra note 105 at 27. 
108 Jane J. Kim, Delinquent Mortgages Set to Nearly Double in 2009, WALL STREET JOURNAL, December 2, 2008. 
109 Id. 
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default event.110 Another study of CDOs from 2005 to 2007 notes that of the $450 billion 
originated during that period 68% are in default.111  The average recovery rate for AAA CDOs 
that have been liquidated from this period is reportedly only 5%.112  Atnje Nerndt and Anurag 
Gupta note that securitized loans are 8-14% more likely to underperform than loans held by 
banks, suggesting that originating banks sell off low quality loans and keep high quality loans.113   
Although the underlying quality of loans in the securitized pools declined during the first 
half of this decade, the independent marker relied on by investors (the letter-grade rating of 
structure finance bonds issued against this collateral) failed to convey useful forward-looking 
information about the true quality of the loans in the CDO pool.114  Over reliance on this marker 
made it possible for a lemons market to develop in the market for securitizations.    
Section 4.  Opaque Default Swap Market Creates Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard is present when a seller’s post-contracting actions are difficult or expensive 
for a buyer to monitor and where payoffs to the seller and the buyer are not symmetrical.   In 
such situations, a seller may acquire additional benefits by undertaking ex post risky behaviors.  
In the event the risky behavior pays off, the seller retains all of the benefits.  In the event the 
risky behavior results in a loss, the buyer is forced to bear the losses.115  Like adverse selection, 
the potential for moral hazard suggests that self-interested, rational actors will withhold 
                                                            
110 Paul J. Davies, Half of All CDOs of ABS Failed, FINANCIAL TIMES, February 10, 2009. 
111 Jillian Tett, Insight: Time to Expose Those CDOs, FINANCIAL TIMES, February 27, 2009 at 22. 
112 Id. 
113 Atnje Nerndt and Anurag Gupta, MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION IN THE ORIGINATE-TO-DISTRIBUTE 
MODEL OF BANK CREDIT (October 24, 2008). 
114 Because the ratings provided by rating agencies are probabilistic projections of default probabilities, they tend to 
lag and not provide much actionable, forward looking information. For example, of the reported 16,587 credit rating 
downgrades in 2008, 92.9% percent of them were downgrades of structured finance vehicles.  Many of these 
vehicles had already suffered default events prior to being downgraded.  Paul J. Davies, Half of All CDOs of ABS 
Failed, FINANCIAL TIMES, February 10, 2009. 
115 Oliver E. Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations, 61 AM. ECON. 
REV. 112, 112 (1971). 
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participation from markets where there is a real possibility for counterparties to engage in 
opportunism.  Notwithstanding that possible outcome, we find many examples of markets where 
moral hazard is present.  The market for credit default swaps, exempted from regulation by the 
2000 CFMA, is one such market.   
The credit default swap is the basic building block of for most credit derivatives.116  In 
essence, the default swap is an insurance contract.117  The default swap transfers the risk of 
default of a reference entity (for example, a BBB CDO bond) from one party to another.  The 
buyer of the default swap makes periodic payments to the seller of the contract.  In the event of a 
default by the reference entity bond, the seller of the swap is obliged to stand in the shoes of the 
reference entity and make payment of the notional principal to the buyer of the swap.118    Buyers 
of bonds can buy insurance policies that effectively provides the same level of protection.  
However, the difference between a default swap and an insurance policy is that a default swap 
does not require that the buyer have an insurable interest.  The lack of an insurable interest 
requirement is what permits the financial industry to use the default swap as a building block on 
top of which they can build other derivative products.119  
                                                            
116 For descriptions of credit default swaps, among others see Lehman Brothers, GUIDE TO EXOTIC CREDIT 
DERIVATIVES at 4; John C. Hull, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES (2001) p507-508; Goodman & 
Fabozzi supra note 99, p 198-199, or Gregory Duffee and Chunsheng Zhou, Credit Derivatives in Banking: Useful 
Tools for Managing Risk?, 48 J. MONETARY ECON. 25, 29-30.   
117 A default swap is not an insurance contract, however.  Most importantly, it differs from an insurance contract in 
that it does not require the protection buyer to have an “insurable interest” in the reference entity.  Robert F. 
Schwartz, Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps, Insurance and a Theory of Demarcation, 
12 FORDHAM J. CORP & FIN. L. 167, 173 (2007) (arguing that default swaps are not insurance contracts).     
118 J.P. Morgan, THE J.P. MORGAN GUIDE TO CREDIT DERIVATIVES.  Also see Lehman Brothers, GUIDE TO EXOTIC 
CREDIT DERIVATIVES.  
119 See discussion of synthetic derivatives below. 
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by the reference entity.  The risk of counterparty default can be mitigated, however, by requiring 
sellers of default swaps to post collateral, thus permitting even sellers with less than AAA ratings 
to sell swaps.122   Because it signals the low probability of a counterparty default, the credit 
rating of the seller of the default swap has market value.  Default swap sellers with AAA ratings 
are, in effect, able to engage in regulatory arbitrage by selling default swaps for relatively low-
rated bonds.123  Due to the high degree of confidence that market participants placed on the value 
of a AAA rating, firms, like AIG, that sold default swaps and maintained AAA ratings were not 
required to post collateral.  Consequently, the letter-grade rating became the only security against 
counterparty risk.   
 
Figure 4: Development of Credit Default Swap Market124 
 
Following the exemption of credit default swaps 
from regulatory oversight, the legal certainty 
provided by this action helped propel the rapid 
development of the market for such swaps.  By end 
of 2007, the notional value of the total market for 
default swaps reached $60 trillion.  According to 
some estimated two‐thirds of the total notional 
value of outstanding default swaps are swaps in 
which neither the buyer nor the seller has an 
interest in the reference entity. 
 
The default swap makes it possible to provide an additional layer of credit enhancement 
to a CDO.  Although subordination and overcollateralization were the primary means of credit 
enhancement in CDO structures, a sponsor of a CDO can improve the credit worthiness of a 
CDO by buying a default swap to insure against the possibility that the CDO might default.  In 
                                                            
122 Sellers with AAA ratings, like AIG and the monoline insurers, were not be required to put up much, if any, 
collateral to back their trades.  See discussion of moral hazard with respect to CDS market below.  
123 Joe Nocera, Propping Up a House of Cards, THE NEW YORK TIMES, February 28, 2009 (noting the importance of 
regulatory arbitrage in AIG’s default swap business). 
124 ISDA Market Survey available at http://www.isda.org/statistics/historical.html. 
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doing so, it becomes possible for a security that might not otherwise be able to attain a AAA 
credit rating to, in effect, hire the balance sheet of a AAA rated CDS seller and thus piggy-back 
on the seller’s rating.   For example, of the $527 billion in default swaps sold by AIG, 
approximately $379 billion were not sold as economic hedges, but as vehicles to permit 
European banks to seek relief from regulatory capital requirements.125  The presence of a default 
swap sold by AAA-rated AIG to a European bank meant that the bank could carry the 
speculative investment in a CDO on its books as a “safe” AAA-rated security and thus remain in 
compliance with the capital requirements of European banking regulators while enjoying a 
speculative return on investments in a rising U.S. real estate market.126   
 The default swap can also be a vehicle for market participants to create new financial 
products known as synthetic derivatives.  This is possible because, unlike a traditional insurance 
contract, neither the buyer nor the seller of a default swap is required to have an ‘insurable 
interest’ in the reference entity.127   A synthetic CDO, for example, can be created by assembling 
a series of default swaps designed to replicate the performance of a CDO reference entity.128  
Since a potentially unlimited number of synthetic CDOs can be created by replicating the 
                                                            
125 By selling default swaps AIG provided a regulatory license to European banks to engage in speculative 
investments in US credit markets.  American International Group, FORM 10-K (as filed with the SEC, February 28, 
2008) at 164.  AIG was by no means alone in engaging in this kind of regulatory arbitrage.  CalPERS also generated 
income by lending out its AAA rating to municipal bond issuers in exchange for fees.  See CalPERS Credit 
Enhancement Facility, available at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-2005/jan/gets-aaa.xml 
(sited November 1, 2008). 
126 AIG, supra note 125 at 164. 
127 Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps, Insurance and a Theory of 
Demarcation, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP & FIN. L. 167, 173 (2007) (discussing the lack of insurable interest requirement 
for default swaps).     
128  Nomura, supra note 79.  Also see Goodman & Fabozzi, supra note 99 at 201-203.  Also see Lehman Brothers, 
supra note 116 at 12. 
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performance of a single reference entity, the synthetic CDO permits market participants to create 
a potentially infinite amount of leverage off a single reference CDO.129 
Moral hazard played out in the default swap market in the following manner.  First, some 
sellers of default swaps relied on their own high credit ratings to avoid making deposits of 
collateral on default swaps that they sold.130  Second, insurance companies that entered the 
default swap market were almost exclusively sellers of default swaps.  Essentially, they made a 
series of one-way bets that real estate prices backing CDOs would not decline over the course of 
the swap contracts.131  In hindsight, these turned out to be imprudent bets.  Third, the opacity of 
the over-the-counter markets for default swaps made it impossible for a buyer of a default swap 
to adequately determine the overall level of counterparty risk undertaken by a seller.  
Consequently, sellers of default swaps, like AIG, were able to undertake much more risk than 
optimal.    Finally, buyers of default swaps were able to use the swaps in order to accept more 
risk than otherwise permitted. 
Some large sellers of default swaps relying on their own high credit ratings were able to 
avoid making deposits of collateral on any swaps they wrote.  Collateral plays an important 
                                                            
129 To create a synthetic CDO a sponsors an entity that sells a series of default swaps against a reference entity.  
These swaps receive periodic premiums that mimic periodic payments of the reference entity to its investors.  These 
payments are distributed to investors using the same waterfall payment structure of a CDO ensuring that AAA rated 
tranches are repaid first and that the equity, or B-piece, takes the first loss in the event of a bond default.  One reason 
why the Financial Crisis of 2008 morphed from an isolated real estate decline to a more general decline was the 
presence of synthetic CDOs acting as a multiplier transmitting poor performance in the real estate sector across 
through a large number of holders of synthetic positions.  
130 Ambac Financial Group, Form 10-K (as filed with the SEC on March 1, 2007) at 56 (noting that was not required 
to supply any collateral for its credit derivatives or total return swaps).  Also see Jonathan R. Laing, Defusing the 
CDS Bomb, BARRON’S, November 17, 2008 at 44 (noting that because of its AAA rating, AIG was not required to 
post collateral on any of its CDS sales). 
131 AIG, supra note 125 at 162 (noting that in most cases AIG’s Financial Products Group did not hedge any of its 
positions with respect to default swaps it sold.)  According to data from the FDIC while banks were also very 
activity in the CDS market, they are both buyers and sellers of these instruments.  The monoline insurance 
companies, on the other hand, were almost exclusively sellers of protection.   
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private ordering role in these transactions.  Collateral acts as a hostage in the sense that when a 
seller of a default swap puts up collateral, she credibly signals to the buyer of the swap that she 
will make good on the contract in the event a default triggers payment.132  In absence of 
collateral, counterparties must rely on other credible signals that indicate likelihood of 
compliance with contractual promises.  The letter-grade rating issued by rating agencies, which 
provides indications of the likelihood of default on debt issues, was such a proxy.  Insurance 
companies with AAA ratings, the highest investment grade rating, indicating a low likelihood of 
default, were able to sell default swaps and third parties, relying on the high quality of the credit 
rating did not require collateral.  
While ratings are an important heuristic for potential investors, they are both a lagging 
indicator and subject to inherent conflicts of interest.   Consequently, they lack the ability to 
constrain moral hazard by sellers of default swaps in the same way that, for example, collateral 
deposits might.  Had sellers been required to maintain sufficient collateral to back their 
commitments, then their balance sheet would have limited the amount of risk they would have 
been capable of taking on.  For example, if a seller or a default swap were required to put up as 
collateral equal to 10% of the notional value of a swap (in cash or Treasuries), the seller’s 
balance sheet would limit the total value of swaps that might be sold and thus limit moral hazard 
on the part of sellers of default swaps.133   On the other hand, since ratings are “sticky” and do 
not change to quickly catch up with issuer behavior, a firm can use its rating opportunistically, 
selling more swaps than is prudent for a given rating.   
                                                            
132 Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM . ECON. REV. 519 
(1983).  
133 Without a capital constraint in the form of a collateral call, the number and amount of default swaps that might be 
sold by any one market participant is almost limitless.   
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In addition, the opaque nature of the over-the-counter swap market makes it impossible 
for even AAA-rated sellers to credibly signal the true extent of their commitments and their risk 
exposure to counterparties.  Part of this opacity is by design.  For example, the lack of 
information with respect to any counterparty’s swap commitments made the default swap 
instrument a useful way of hedging counterparty risk without damaging long-term relationships 
and thus it was useful for counterparties to enter these “dark markets.”134  On the other hand, the 
lack of information with respect to the nature and quality of a seller’s risk exposure makes it 
difficult to constrain opportunistic behavior by sellers of default swaps who are willing to take 
on an excessive risk.   
During the period of the real estate bubble, AIG and other insurance companies began to 
write default swaps against CDO’s in large numbers.  Unlike banks which both bought and sold 
default swaps leaving their net position generally not far out of balance, insurance companies 
participated in the over-the-counter credit default swap market exclusively as sellers.135  In 
hindsight, these insurers were able to arbitrage the value of their ratings and accept much more 
risk with respect to these assets than was optimal.   For example, during the mid-1990’s Ambac 
Financial Group, an insurance company, began to rapidly develop its business of providing credit 
enhancement to asset backed securities like CDOs.  In 1996, Ambac had guarantees in place for 
only $8 million of asset backed securities.136  By 2007, the amount of the guarantees in place 
rose to over $170 million.  Because buyers of the swaps relied on Ambac’s AAA rating to 
                                                            
134 The default swap was marketed by the investment banks as a confidential way of hedging exposure in the 
marketplace. J.P. MORGAN GUIDE TO CREDIT DERIVATIVES (PUBLISHED BY RISKMETRICS). 
135 Bank data from FDIC Information Center available at www.fdic.gov.  
136 Prior to its entry into the CDS market, Ambac was a monoline insurer, providing insurance policies against 
defaults of municipal bonds.  Ambac Financial Group, Inc., Form 10-K (as filed with the SEC, March 31, 1997) at 
12. 
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guarantee payment Ambac was not required post of collateral against any of these swaps.137  AIG 
was an extreme example of moral hazard playing out.  By 2007, AIG had sold more than $500 
billion of default swaps against CDO’s.138  In essence, AIG made a $500 billion dollar bet that 
the US real estate bubble would not collapse.139  That turned out to be a mistake.  
Insurance companies with AAA ratings were, for all intents and purposes, unconstrained 
in their ability to write default swaps and take on risk.  The prospect of generating a steady 
stream of income without the requirement of putting collateral at risk translates into a strong 
incentive for sellers of default swaps to over-leverage.140  These insurance companies engaged in 
a series of one-way bets on the performance of the real estate assets that backed the CDOs they 
were insuring.141  Without the benefit of a hedge of these transactions through netting (exposure 
of a sale being offset through exposure in a purchase) or collateral deposits, the insurance 
                                                            
137 Ambac Financial Group, Inc., Form 10-K (as filed with the SEC, February 29, 2008) at 77.  MBIA, another 
monoline insurer, engaged in the sale of default swaps for structured finance products on similar terms as Ambac.  
MBIA wrote some $300 million of default swaps during that same period.  MBIA, Inc., FORM 10-K (as filed with 
the SEC, Feb. 29, 2008) at 57. 
138 AIG, supra note 125 at 164. 
139 At the same time, AIG had only $129 billion in total invested assets across the entire firm that it might be able to 
liquidate to the potential liability in the event its $500 billion bet on real estate went bad.  AIG, supra note 125 at 
101.  
140 Carrick Mollenkamp, Serena Ng, Liam Leven, and Randall Smith, Behind AIG’s Fall, Risk Models Failed to 
Pass Real-World Test, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, October 31, 2008 at A1 (noting that firms like AIG did not 
believe the risk of default with respect to the underlying real estate to be high). 
141AIG supra note 125 at 33 (noting that more than $300 billion in default swaps were sold to European financial 
institutions seeking relief from regulatory capital requirements).  While Ambac and other monoline insurers do not 
disclosure whether they hedged any of the CDS’s they sold as credit enhancement, they describe themselves as 
being in the business of selling (and not buying) such derivatives suggesting that they may not have hedged their 
positions.  This would be unusual.  Following 2000, commercial and savings banks almost tripled their exposure to 
derivative trades.  It is true however that although most banks were net buyers of protection their net positions were 
not excessive. [http://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/index.html].  Unlike AIG and the monoline insurers, Lehman 
Brothers took positions on both sides in the default swap market.  Consequently, following Lehman’s collapse, sell-
side and buy-side default swaps could be netted out, thus reducing the total exposure of counterparties.  Such netting 
was not possible with AIG.  Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., FORM 10-K (filed with the SEC on February 13, 2007) 
at 91 (noting that its net exposure was approximately $15 billion). 
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companies participating in the default swap markets were able to, and did, take on much more 
risk than was prudent.142 
Finally, European financial institutions in particular were able to accept much more risk 
that was prudent under the regulatory requirements thanks to the presence of default swap 
instruments.  The approximately $300 billion of default swaps sold to European investors in 
effect permitted them to enjoy higher yield returns for what they, in effect, were able to declare 
to regulators were AAA investments.   The presence of default swaps permitted institutional 
buyers to accept higher than optimal levels of risk exposure to U.S. real estate markets while 
under estimating for the benefit of regulators their potential loss exposure.   
 
Section 5.  Shocks and Linkages 
The Financial Crisis of 2008 revealed a lesson that has been taught before:  Excess 
leverage can generate systemic risk.   While the presence of leverage through the use of CDOs 
and default swaps can increase returns, it also increases linkages in the system and degrades the 
robustness of diversification as a risk management tool.143  Leverage can be the source for 
transmission of credit distress from a borrower to a lender and then throughout the financial 
                                                            
142 For its part, AIG substantially underestimated the likelihood that it would ever have to make payment on any of 
these contracts.  The former head of AIG’s Financial Products division commented about the likelihood of losses 
stemming from its CDS business on an investor call saying, “It is hard for us, without being flippant, to even see a 
scenario within any kind of realm or reason that would see us losing $1 in any of those [referring to CDS] 
transactions.”  See David Voreacos and Elliot Bair Smith, Cassano’s Statements on AIG Probed by Prosecutors, 
People Say, BLOOMBERG.COM available at 
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=a6m_BOe9Ftk4&refer=news.   
143 President’s Working Group on Financial Markets Report on Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-
Term Capital Management, April 1999 (U.S. Department of the Treasury);  and see Roger Lowenstein, WHEN 
GENIUS FAILED (2000) at 42 (on leverage and the effects of leverage in linking disparate participants in the financial 
system).  
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system.  Where the transmission is widespread, then credit distress can quickly transform itself 
into panic as counterparties seek to rapidly unwind positions and exit the credit markets in search 
of liquidity in response to an exogenous shock.144  In that sense, leverage is a financial 
accelerator in times of distress.   
The situation described above was worsened by the use synthetic derivatives.145  Because 
of the opacity in the over-the-counter market for default swaps, and the replicative nature of the 
synthetic derivative, it becomes impossible to know, and thus constrain through private ordering, 
the true extent of counterparty risk.146    Synthetic derivatives permitted market participants to 
generate potentially infinite levels of leverage.  The additional leverage from synthetic 
derivatives created deeper and unexpected interconnections among participants and thus 
accelerated distress throughout the system.    
Two additional lessons from the Financial Crisis of 2008 are already clear.  First, the 
additional stability that was supposed to result from deregulation of the financial system 
following the repeal of Glass-Steagall is not apparent.  In fact, consolidation and the structural 
changes in the financial industry, including permitting bank holding companies to engage in 
unlimited underwriting and dealing in securities, may have resulted in more concentrated risks 
                                                            
144 “A financial crisis is fueled by fears that means of payment will be unobtainable at any price and, in a fractional 
reserve banking system it is during these periods of unwinding that institutions are at risk of transmission of panic 
from one actor to another through their interconnected financial transactions. … This transmission is also known as 
'systemic risk' or the transmission of on party's "economic distress" to a counterparty.” Jean-Charles Rochet and 
Jean Tirole, Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk, 28 J. MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 733, 733 (Nov. 1996).  
Deleveraging exercises were at the heart of the Crash of 1929 and LTCM’s collapse.  An exogenous shock leads to 
lowering of the value of collateral put up to finance the purchase of securities, the forced sale of those assets drives 
prices down further, causing additional liquidations.  See Bagehot, supra note 5 and Lowenstein supra note 143 at 
143.   
145 Partnoy and Skeel make a similar argument that credit derivatives create a risk of systemic failure.  Partnoy and 
Skueel are that they do so in part because they reduce lenders’ incentives to monitor borrower behavior and thus fuel 
credit expansion. See Frank Partnoy and David A. Skeel, Credit Derivatives: Promise and Peril of Credit 
Derivatives, 75 U. CINN. L. REV. 1019 (2007).  
146 Jane Baird, Synthetic CDO Default Losses Likely to Multiply, THE GUARDIAN, November 21, 2008, available at 
guardian.co.uk (noting the difficulty in determining the size of CDS liabilities). 
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and stronger linkages among financial institutions.  Increased concentration leads to an 
amplification of shocks, rather than a dissipation of them.   Although deregulation of the banking 
system was supposed to result in a more robust financial system, increased exposure to risk 
through bank holding company exposure to asset-backed securities may have left the financial 
system more fragile.147  Relying on third parties to originate mortgages created a lemons market 
for asset-backed securities. To the degree that bank holding companies were left holding riskier 
securities tied to that lemons market they suffered as the true value of those assets became 
known. 
Second, during the Financial Crisis of 2008 financial firms like Bears Stearns, Lehman 
Brothers and AIG became too dependent on the repurchase market (“repo” market) for financing 
operations.148  Dependence on this short term commercial paper market for financing appears to 
have been a classic short-long fallacy (borrowing short to invest long) with the consequence that 
firms reliant on the repo market were highly leveraged and not able to withstand significant 
stresses when the values of assets used as collateral (illiquid CDO’s) collapsed.149   
At the tail end of the real estate bubble three things happened that when combined served 
to quickly let the air out of the financial bubble that had accompanied the run up in real estate 
prices.  First, private parties introduced a market index that tracked the value of default swaps 
written against a basket of CDOs.  Second, changes in accounting rules in 2006 required holders 
of non-liquid bonds to use this index in order to determine the fair value of such bonds.  Third, as 
                                                            
147 President’s Working Group on Financial Markets Report on Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-
Term Capital Management, April 1999 (U.S. Department of the Treasury) at 20.  
148 Carrick Mollenkamp et al, Lehman’s Demise Triggered Cash Crunch Around Globe, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, September 29, 2008.  Tobias Adrian and Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity and Leverage, FEDERAL RESERVE 
BANK STAFF REPORT, NO. 328 (May 2008). And see Office of the Inspector General, Securities Exchange 
Commission, SEC’s Oversight of Bear Stearns and Related Entities, Report No. 446-A (September 25, 2008). 
149 Adrian and Shin, supra note 148 (noting that investment banks tend to increase their leverage in good times 
making them more vulnerable to sudden downturns). 
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the new index declined, holders of non-liquid CDOs were required to write down the value of 
those bonds, which resulted in these holders having to meet collateral calls in the short term debt 
markets.150   
Although the housing bubble had already begun to cool, the addition of information to 
the marketplace in the form of the ABX derivative index was the impetus for the Financial Crisis 
of 2008.151  The introduction of the ABX provided “boundedly rational” market participants 
important and readily accessible information about the value of CDOs held as collateral in the 
short term repurchase market.  CDOs are illiquid investments and not generally traded.  Until the 
introduction of this index, market information about the performance of CDO’s was difficult to 
come by.  The introduction of the ABX index, which tracked the performance of default swaps 
written against CDOs, provided market participants a source of information against which they 
could infer the value of illiquid CDO’s.  
 Almost from its inception in January 2006, the value of this index declined.152  The 
consequence of the decline in this index was a rapid devaluation of the value of assets held on 
the balance sheet of financial firms.153    This decline had significant knock-on effects in the repo 
                                                            
150 Ultimately, the weight of these margin calls brought down the investment banks Bear Stearns and Lehman 
Brothers and contributed to the collapse of AIG.  Carrick Mollenkamp et al, Lehman’s Demise Triggered Cash 
Crunch Around Globe, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, September 29, 2008 and see Serena Ng and Liam Pleven, An 
AIG Unit’s Quest to Juice Profit, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, February 5, 2009 at C1.  
151 The ABX Index is available here: http://www.markit.com/information/products/category/indices/abx.html.   
Gorton and Shiller also make this point. See Gary Gorton, THE PANIC OF 2007 and Robert Shiller, THE SUBPRIME 
SOLUTION (2008) at 47.  This index has been followed other indices tracking the performance of over-the-counter 
default swaps.  See  Matthew Leising and Shannon Harrington, S&P Starts Three Default Swap Indexes a Year 
Later Than Planned, BLOOMBERG NEWS SERVICE, January 21, 2009 available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601009&sid=aLCNBJIsERKs&refer=bond . 
152 Gorton, supra note 45 at 56.   
153  Prior to the introduction of mark-to-market accounting rules in 2006 (“FAS 157”), parties were permitted to 
carry the value of securities for which there was not a secondary market on their books at book value.  FAS 157 
requires that assets be carried on a firm’s books at their fair value.  FAS 157 requires that if there were no 
observable market-based inputs to help determine fair value that a firm may rely on “unobservable inputs.”  The use 
of unobservable inputs permits holders of illiquid assets the ability to carry such assets on their books at close to, or 
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markets where CDOs were held as collateral.154  The repo market is an overnight lending market 
in which the borrower sells the lender the collateral with a promise to repurchase the collateral 
the next day for the value of the collateral plus some interest.155  The collateral used in these 
transactions is typically a marketable security, like stocks or bonds.  While these repurchase 
agreements are short term in nature they are highly secure for lenders, so lenders regularly roll 
over, or extend, the transactions, thus creating working capital for borrowers.  These transactions 
can break down, however, when the collateral loses value.156    
 Both Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, like many other firms, relied on the repo market 
for their short term financing.   Structurally, these firms were highly leveraged.  Lehman’s 
leverage ratio in 2007 was 31 to 1.157  Just prior to Bear Stearns’ collapse, its leverage ratio was 
reported to be 33 to 1.158  For both firms as well as AIG, CDOs were the securities used to back 
this borrowing in the repo market.159  So long as the true value of these securities was determined 
by unobservable inputs, then these securities could be valued at near book value and both the 
lender and the borrower could turn a blind eye to the bad news in the real estate market.  Once, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
even above, book value.  If there is observable market data, either an active secondary market or activity in a related 
market that provides data that can provide a valuation of the assets, then such data must be used in order to calculate 
fair value.  A market index of CDS’ written against CDO securities, like the ABX, requires holders of other similar 
CDO’s to use the index to assign a value to their securities.  Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 157 (September 2006). 
154 Office of the Inspector General, Securities Exchange Commission, SEC’s Oversight of Bear Stearns and Related 
Entities, Report No. 446-A (September 25, 2008) and see Adrian and Shin, supra note 148.  And see Mollenkamp et 
al, supra note 148 and also Ng and Pleven, supra note 150.   AIG also noted in its 2007 annual report that its 
valuation of CDOs held on its books was negatively impacted by the prices of default swaps for CDOs backed by 
US residential mortgages.  See AIG, supra note 125 at 83. 
155 Unlike central bank borrowing available to banking institutions, no central counterparty stands between a 
borrower in the repo market and lenders.  Consequently, a default by one large borrower can be quickly transmitted 
throughout the financial system and affect remote, seemingly unrelated entities.    
156 Kenneth Miller, The US Dollar Repo Market, in SECURITIES LENDING REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS (Frank 
Fabozzi, ed.)(1997). 
157 Bear Stearns Report, supra note 148 at p120.   
158 Id. 
159 AIG also relied on borrowing and lending activities in the repo markets.  AIG, like Lehman and Bear Stearns 
used CDO’s as collateral in its borrowing and lending.  In AIG’s case, it borrowed against CDO’s and then used the 
cash to invest in more CDO’s and thus generate a higher return.  When the value of this collateral collapsed, this 
placed large stress on AIG to liquidate positions and generate cash.  See Ng and Pleven supra note 150.  
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however, the ABX index for CDOs was introduced, lenders had a market-based predictor of 
default risk for CDO securities and were required to use that data to infer a market price for 
collateral they were holding.  The increasing likelihood of default of such securities as indicated 
by the ABX index caused lenders in the repo market to raise their collateral requirements, or 
even refuse to accept CDOs as collateral.160  This started the daisy-chain of distressed asset sales 
as market participants sold off higher quality assets to acquire Treasuries to use as collateral in 
the short term markets.161  When ultimately Bear Stearns and Lehman were unable to do this, 
both of these institutions collapsed.162   
  
Section 6: The Failure of Private Ordering 
It now appears clear that that the efficient capital markets hypothesis has run its course as 
an animating principle for deregulatory trend of the past three decades.   Our collective mistake 
has been to design a regulatory structure that incorporated the assumptions of the market model 
while ignoring many of the important frictions (transaction and agency costs as well as socio-
behavioral results) that can lead to market failures.163  In short, policymakers have collectively 
confused an elegant model with a road-map for action.164   
                                                            
160 By 2008, repo transactions involving corporate bonds or structured finance products were no longer possible.  
This created a rush to high-quality collateral (U.S. Treasuries) as repo market participants sold off low-quality assets 
in order to purchase high-quality assets that might be used in repo transactions.  Naohiko Baba, Blaise Gadanecz and 
Patrick McGuire, Highlights of International Banking and Financial Market Activity, BIS Q. REV. 25, 43 (December 
2008). 
161 Id. 
162 Ben Bernanke, Reducing Systemic Risk: Remarks of Chairman Ben Bernanke at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City’s Annual Economic Symposium, Jackson Hole, WY (August 22, 2008) (describing the collapse of Bear 
Stearns). 
163 Coase noted his own frustration that so many observers had focused on the idea that markets operating in the 
absence of frictions should be able to reach efficient outcomes rather than the implication that real markets operating 
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Where information is costless, rational, self-interested market participants will seek to 
structure transactions to protect themselves from opportunistic behavior.  In such a world, prices 
will always reflect all the information available in the marketplace.  Indeed there would be little 
place for regulation and the law as private parties costlessly contracted for solutions.  Such a 
world only exists on the pages of textbooks, however.  Assumptions of rationality in the market 
model are just that – assumptions – and not a description of actual outcomes.165  By now, the 
empirical challenges to this ideological view of the market model are many.166  While the market 
model assumes perfect information and perfect comprehension by market participants, we know 
that real market actors are limited in their cognitive ability, relying on heuristics to aid decision 
making, thus leaving themselves susceptible to the problems of both transaction costs and agency 
costs.  In addition, market participants exhibit biases, altruism, myopia, etc.  They also disregard 
the permanent income hypothesis, act in irrational ways and exhibit a host of other secular 
imperfections that put them at odds with the market model.167   Market participants are also 
susceptible to bouts of euphoria associated with bubble markets.168   
Although there are a number of elements present in the financial markets that might have 
made it possible for parties in these markets to rely on private ordering, in nearly every material 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
with those frictions face challenges to reaching efficient results on their own.  Ronald Coase, THE FIRM, THE 
MARKET AND THE LAW (1998).  
164  Richard Thaler, THE WINNER’S CURSE (1992) at 4 (also making this point). 
165 Behavioral economists, including Thaler, also recognize this limitation.  Richard Thaler, THE WINNER’S CURSE 
(1992). Also see Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES ( 2000); Daniel Kahneman, 
Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982); and Cass R. 
Sunstein (ed.) BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (2000). 
166 The work of behavioral economists has contributed a great deal to understanding the limits of the market model 
in real life.  Empirical challenges to the market model and the so-called ‘contractarian’ approach to law are also 
increasingly common.  For example see Robert Daines and Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm 
Value?, 17, J. L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (2001). 
167  See Thaler, supra note 165;  Kahneman and Tversky, supra note 165; Kahneman et al supra note 165; and 
Sunstein supra note 165. 
168 Two asset price bubbles (tech stocks and real estate) over the past decade are proof of the truth of this statement.   
Kindleberger, supra note 3 (describing the pathology of a bubble). 
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instance over the past few years these private ordering mechanisms failed to generate the desired 
outcome.169  In part, this failure stems from the fact that market participants are typically 
institutions and organizations represented by of individual agents (brokers, salesmen, etc.) and 
not rational actors per se.  Each of the institutional agents acts with its own self-interest and with 
its own irrational biases that may compete with the interests of the principal.  Even as the 
organization has the incentive to regulate its own opportunistic behavior, it has to cope with 
competing internal interests that might in fact encourage more opportunism.170  Where the degree 
of friction is high, one cannot always expect institutions to demonstrate rational behavior.  
Where agents are able to influence institutional behavior institutionally efficient private ordering 
may not be a consistent outcome.  The failure of institutions to constrain their own opportunistic 
behavior was demonstrated in a number of ways. 
First, even sophisticated investors exhibited cognitive limitations in their decision making 
processes.  CDO instruments are complex financial instruments.  Rather than attempt to absorb 
and analyze all available information before making investment decisions, investors relied on 
heuristics.171  The heuristic of most importance to many of these decisions was the letter-grade 
                                                            
169 Because of the amount and quality of information available and the generally low cost of entry and exit, financial 
markets are generally thought to be the most efficient markets available.  In his classic book on the efficiency of 
financial markets Malkiel argued that financial markets are so efficient that a blindfolded chimpanzee throwing darts 
at the Wall Street Journal can select a portfolio as well as one managed by an expert.  Burton G. Malkiel, A 
RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET (2003) at p17.  
170 For example, a bank originating a mortgage may have a long-term interest in developing and maintaining a 
reputation on the marketplace as an originator or high quality mortgages.  The originating agent, however, may have 
a different interest – a commission or bonus tied to short term results.  In such a situation, the incentives of the agent 
can work counter to the interests of the principal.  This dynamic appears to have been common in the mortgage 
securitization market up until 2008.  Alternatively, while a firm like AIG might have a long-term interest in 
maintaining its insurance business, actors within the firm may have had other, more short term interests, that 
compelled the firm adopt a particular bias with respect to the future of real estate markets and thus take on more risk 
than was advisable. 
171 Jeffrey J. Rachinlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165 (2002) 
(relying on heuristics in the face of complex decisions).  Also see Lloyd Blankfein, Do Not Destroy the Essential 
Catalyst of Risk, FINANCIAL TIMES, February 9, 2009 at 7 (noting that investors relied on rating agencies because the 
underlying securities were too complex for them to understand). 
51 
 
rating, an independent marker, provided by one of a number of rating agencies.  Although 
lending standards fell during the period of the real estate bubble, the meaning conveyed by these 
independent markers did not.  Ratings failed to identify a material change in the quality of assets 
backing AAA rated CDOs.  Because the heuristic investors were relying on did not reflect the 
true underlying value of the investment instruments, cognitively limited market participants were 
not able to recognize this market failure until a lemons market for subprime assets had 
developed.172   
With respect to the information asymmetries that might have existed between originators 
of mortgages and sponsors of CDO pools, one would expect rational actors to rely on vertical 
integration or the prospect of repeat transactions to increase information and thus reduce 
transaction costs.173  By the tail end of the real estate bubble, sponsors of CDO’s had begun to 
vertically integrate into the mortgage origination business.174  The optimistic interpretation of 
their vertical integration was that the structured finance sponsors understood that they were 
facing high transaction costs and sought to reduce the information asymmetries associated with 
creating pools of mortgages for their CDO products.  In this view, vertical integration would lead 
to higher quality as parties solved the lemons problem.  The less optimistic interpretation is that 
the sponsors were not as interested in the quality of the underlying assets as they were in 
assuring access to a continuing stream of mortgage originations to feed to new CDO pools.  In 
hindsight, the latter interpretation appears to have been true.  
                                                            
172  Ratings agencies themselves may have been subject to an availability bias.  The models used to value CDO 
assets did not include scenarios with a nationwide decline in housing prices of the sort that eventually occurred.  
173 Williamson, supra note 115 at 112. 
174 Lehman Brothers had control of at least two subprime originators, BNC Mortgage and Aurora Loan Services, 
which it merged into a single unit in 2007.  Bear Stearns acquired a subprime mortgage origination unit Encore 
Credit Corp. in 2006.  See Bear Stearns to Acquire ECC Capital’s Mortgage Origination Unit, BUSINESS WIRE, 
October 10, 2006, and also see Lehman to Merge Two Residential Mortgage Units, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 14, 
2007. 
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Investment banks found themselves at the center of the lemons market in which they 
engaged in opportunistic behavior with respect to counterparties and markets by supplying lower 
than stated quality instruments to buyers of CDOs.  Agency costs can explain some of the 
failures within the financial institutions to constrain their own opportunistic behavior.   Agents of 
the financial institutions did not share either the same incentives or time horizons of the 
institutions they represented.  For example, CDO salesmen might be compensated with annual 
salaries and bonuses tied to short-term results, like the number of CDOs sponsored or sold.  
Their compensation was not necessarily tied to the long-term value of those mortgages or the 
ultimate performance of the CDO.175   If successful agents can earn sufficient compensation over 
the course of one or two years, then their long-term interest decouples from the long-term 
interest of the firm.176  In that respect agents may have had more incentive to engage in 
opportunism, including excessively risky behavior, at the expense of the firm and its long-term 
reputational capital.177      
In the credit default swap market, market participants also exhibited susceptibility to 
information asymmetries.  Rather than investigate the underlying value of CDO instruments, 
parties relied on the credit rating heuristic to provide a reliable signal of the likelihood that a 
counterparty might default.  The presence of an AAA-rated insurance company, like AIG or 
MBIA, as a counterparty was sufficient to permit buyers to engage in these transactions without 
requiring the counterparty to commit collateral.  Reliance on the rating of a CDS seller turned 
                                                            
175 The same dynamic is true of agents of mortgage originators with respect to new mortgage approvals.  
176 The firm has a long-term interest in generating a valuable reputation which can be converted into repeat 
transactions and additional firm value.  With sufficient short term compensation, agents of the firm become end-
game players and thus more likely to engage in opportunistic behavior.  Robert Axelrod, THE EVOLUTION OF 
COOPERATION (1984) (for a discussion of the value of repeat transactions). 
177 Such behavior might include structuring collateralized debt obligations of low quality and knowingly marketing 
them to long-term firm clients, as was the case in many of the major investment banks on Wall Street. Alternatively, 
it might involve agents of the firm engaging in risky one-way bets on asset prices, as was the case with AIG. 
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out to be misplaced.  With respect to the sellers of default swaps themselves, they appeared to 
systematically underestimate the probability of a decline in national real estate values and few 
assumed that it could happen.178  As a consequence, firms like AIG undertook much more risk 
than was optimal (moral hazard).  They were able to temporarily generate large cash flows off of 
sales of CDS for which thought they might never have to make payment and against which they 
put down no collateral.  When it became apparent that insurers had systematically 
underestimated default probabilities, the insurers collapsed as counterparties began to demand 
collateral and payment on the contracts. 
It is clear that notwithstanding the availability of private ordering alternatives, none of the 
mechanisms that one might typically rely on, including vertical integration, iterative contracting, 
reputation, and reputational intermediaries were effective in stemming opportunistic behavior.  
In some cases, in inability of private ordering mechanisms to stem opportunism can be traced to 
transaction and agency costs that interfere with the operation of the market mechanism.  In 
others, efficient market operation was stymied by a systematic mispricing of risk by market 
participants.  Specific changes can be adopted in order to address the specific shortcomings in 
the securitization model, the market for default swaps, as well as the utter failure of the NRSROs 
to play an effective private ordering role. 
The market failures of the Financial Crisis of 2008 call us to address more than just micro 
level changes to the regulatory structure.   Rather, the Financial Crisis of 2008 requires that we 
begin a wholesale reconsideration of our regulatory approaches.  Our previous confidence that 
                                                            
178 Such an assumption may have been reinforced by an availability bias (there had not been a nationwide decline in 
housing prices in the US since the Great Depression and the recent experience of Japan with declining asset values is 
remote).  Coval, et al note that the complexity of the CDO squared products makes it very easy to underestimate 
their default risk as rating agencies appear to have done.  See Joshua Coval, et al, The Economics of Structured 
Finance, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 20 (2009).  Rachinlinski, supra note 171 at 1171 (availability biases).   
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rational actors and market forces would provide the financial system with sufficient protections 
from opportunism and market collapse has proven itself inadequate to the task.  Rather than 
generate more resilience and efficient allocations of capital, our hands-off approach towards 
regulation of financial markets resulted in speculative bubbles, over-leverage and dangerous 
interconnections among financial institutions generating unwanted systemic risk.  Going 
forward, we must refashion regulatory structures to take advantage of market incentives while 
recognizing and accounting for how the imperfections of the marketplace affect efficient 
decision-making.   
A. Covered Bonds and the Securitization Process 
The remoteness of the investor to the borrower that is typical of the “originate-to-distribute” 
model of securitization created incentives for originators to develop low quality asset pools.  
Complexity of the investment vehicles drove investors to rely on ratings, rather than due 
diligence, to guide investment decisions.179  Consequently, a lemons market for securities backed 
by residential mortgages developed.  The collapse of the market offers an opportunity to rethink 
the securitization model and perhaps structure a new approach that is both efficiency enhancing 
as well as sustainable over time.   
A number of other commentators have recommended changes to the regulatory structures 
surrounding securitization to address the problems made evident by the collapse of the subprime 
market.  Understandably many of these recommendations approach the issue from a consumer 
protection point of view.  For example, Kathleen Engel & Patricia McCoy recommend a process 
model that would require originators of mortgages to conduct a minimum level of due diligence 
on every loan application in order to assure that low quality loans do not reach the securitization 
                                                            
179 One consequence was that lending by large banks engaged in securitization resembled uninformed lending.  See 
Loutskina and Strahan, supra note 87. 
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pool and to make originators liable to the trusts that hold the loans in the event they fall below 
the standard.180  Noting that assigning liability to investors may not result in private enforcement 
actions, Christopher Peterson recommends assigning liability for violation of consumer 
protection laws to the investment banks that arrange securitizations.181  By placing liability on 
the investment banks that arrange securitizations, Prof. Peterson argues that investment banks 
could avoid liability by simply dealing with non-predatory originators.182. 
While these recommendations have some merit, they do not adequately address the 
underlying incentives structures that led to the lemons market in real estate CDOs.  In particular, 
the remoteness between origination and the securitization vehicle results in large transactions 
costs.  The information asymmetries that stem from this relationship are likely large enough that 
it may be impossible for an investment bank arranging securitizations ever have sufficient 
confidence in the quality of the underwriting process leading to a securitization.  Rather than 
unbundling the credit process (contracting), the socially efficient outcome should require vertical 
integration on the lending process.183 
Compare the originate-to-distribute model with a more traditional lending model where a 
financial institution both services and holds mortgages that it originates.  Although incentives in 
the traditional lending model are more perfectly aligned to monitor against introducing lemons to 
the lending pool, and traditional lending results in the generation more private information and 
                                                            
180 Engel and McCoy, supra note 61at 2087-2090.   
181 Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2279-2281 (2007). 
182 Id. There are law suits presently pending that test a version of the claims Peterson put forward.  Specifically, 
Ambac has a pending law suit against Bear Stearns claiming that in organizing CDO’s against which Ambac 
ultimately sold default swaps that Bear Stearns violated its representations and warranties relating to, among other 
things, its due diligence and underwriting standards as they pertained to the underlying assets in the CDO pool. See 
complaint Ambac/Bear Stearns. 
183 Oliver E. Williamson, supra note 115 at 112. 
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therefore more informed lending, there are significant limits to this model.184  First, this model 
limits the amount of capital a financial institution to the deposits it can raise internally.185  
Second, internally financing and holding loans makes it difficult for financial institutions to 
hedge geographic or sector risk.  These limitations suggest that a return to the days before 
securitization might not be socially optimal. 
Economists have long noted that if a bank can maintain an interest in a loan after selling 
it, then the originating institution has less incentive to engage in the type of opportunistic 
behavior endemic to the originate-to-distribute model.186  Changes in accounting rules could 
encourage financial institutions that originate residential mortgages to maintain interests in the 
loans they originate, thereby aligning internal incentives.187  By eliminating the ability of 
originators to account for sales of loans as true sales, although continuing to permit accounting 
for partial sales, financial institutions could still get the benefit of securitization while retaining 
some of the risks of the loans.188  Although the incentives associated with maintaining an interest 
more closely align the interests of the originator and the investor, they are not perfect.189  On the 
margin, banks that are not bearing the full cost of the contingent liability associated with loans 
they originate have an incentive to add low quality loans to a securitization pool.    
                                                            
184 Loutskina and Strahan, supra note 87. 
185 Gary Gorton and G. Pennacchi, Banking and Loan Sales: Marketing Nonmarketable Assets, 35 J. MONETARY 
ECON. 389, 401 (1995). 
186 Id. at 390 (1995); also see Hayne and Pyle supra note 4 at 372 (noting that investing one’s own capital is a 
credible signal about the quality of the underlying asset). 
187 FASB 140 permits securitizations to be accounted for in one of the following ways:  a sale (where the seller has 
no continuing interest in the loan), as a financing (where the transfer fails to meet one of the conditions of FASB 
140), as neither a sale nor a financing (a swap) or as a partial sale (where the transferor retains the servicing interest 
or some other interest in the bonds that result from the securitization).  See Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
No. 140 (September 2000).  And see Marty Rosenblatt and Jim Johnson, SECURITIZATION ACCOUNTING UNDER 
FASB 140 (Deloitte & Touche) January 2001 at 7.  
188Rosenblatt and Johnson, supra note 187 at 7.  
189 Gorton and Pennacchi, supra note 185 at 401. 
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By implication, a more efficient financing structure would be one that both permits 
originating financial institutions the ability to access capital markets while overcoming the 
information asymmetries associated with origination.  In the summer of 2008 the Department of 
the Treasury, the Federal Reserve and the FDIC began encouraging the development of covered 
bonds.190  Covered bonds are an innovation that permits financial institutions to align incentives 
while accessing capital markets.191   
In a covered bond transaction, the originating financial institution “ring-fences” a pool of 
mortgages on its balance sheet.  The institution is then able to issue bonds in the capital markets 
backed by that pool of mortgages.192  The issuer is required to maintain the performance of the 
pool, replacing non-performing assets with performing ones.193  Although the bonds are backed 
by the cover assets, the issuer remains liable for the repayment of the bonds.  In bankruptcy, the 
mortgages backing the bonds are protected from the bank’s creditors.  The assets in the ring-
fenced pool would continue to service the bonds.  In the event the ring-fenced assets are not 
sufficient to pay bondholders, bondholders then become creditors of the bank on par with other 
creditors.194  In that way, bondholders have recourse both through asset pool as well as directly 
against the issuer as creditors.195   
                                                            
190 Secretary Henry M. Paulson Statement on Covered Bonds, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, July 28, 2008; 
Governor Kevin Warsh Remarks on Covered Bond Framework, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
SYSTEM, July 28, 2008, and see FDIC Board Approves Final Covered Bond Policy Statement, FDIC PRESS 
RELEASE, July 15, 2008.  
191 Although covered bonds are new to the U.S. capital market, they are common in European markets where they 
have a long history and are available in nearly all European markets. U.S. Department of the Treasury, BEST 
PRACTICES FOR COVERED BONDS, July 2008 at 9.  Also see Frank Packer, Ryan Stever and Christian Unger, The 
Covered Bond Market, 9/07 BIS Q. REV. 43 (Sept. 2007).  
192 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, COVERED BOND POLICY STATEMENT, July 15, 2008.  
193 This is an improvement over current securitization practices, which do not require originators to maintain the 
quality of a pool of mortgages beyond a 60 or 90 initial window.  
194 U.S. Department of the Treasury, BEST PRACTICES FOR COVERED BONDS, July 2008. 
195 Packer et al, supra note 191 at 44. 
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Ring-fencing assets and leaving them on one’s books, makes it possible to raise 
additional capital through a securitization-like process.  Because the assets remain on the books 
of the issuer incentives are aligned in a manner that overcomes the problems of information 
asymmetries inherent in the originate-to-distribute model.196  The covered bond aligns incentives 
and permits originators to get access to capital markets to expand lending.  Because maintaining 
a cover pool can be a costly signal, thinly capitalized mortgage companies and brokers, those 
most likely to engage in predatory lending practices, may find it impossible to sponsor covered 
bonds and can be expected to drop out of the market.197  
    
B. Clearinghouses for Default Swaps  
Derivative transactions can be valuable and efficiency enhancing transactions.  Parties 
can enter into such transactions to hedge against real risks, like the price of fuel increasing or the 
likelihood of an important creditor defaulting.  These hedges are socially efficient.  Banning 
default swaps completely as some have suggested would be a mistake.198  On the other hand, the 
experience with the CDS market during the Financial Crisis of 2008 suggests that the regulatory 
exemption provided under the Commodity Futures Modernization Act for over-the-counter 
derivatives has not resulted in the robust private ordering of such transactions that was expected.  
Indeed, the over-the-counter default swap market appears to have been subject to considerable 
moral hazard by both sellers and buyers.   Given the importance of counter party risk and ability 
                                                            
196 Which includes raising capital at prices less than the cost of additional deposits.  For discussion of the cost of 
capital in banking see Gorton and Pennacchi, supra note 185 at 394. 
197 Although costly credibly signal quality to potential counterparties, they can result in overinvestment and 
therefore be socially inefficient.  Following the Financial Crisis of 2008, it is likely that the costs associated with 
such a signal are lower than the costs associated with permitting a lemons market in the securitization market to 
develop.  Michael Spence, Informational Aspects of Market Structure: An Introduction, 90 Q. J. ECON. 591, 596 
(1976) (on the social cost of signals). 
198 George Soros, The Game Changer, FINANCIAL TIMES, January 29, 2009 at 8 (arguing that default swaps should 
be banned). 
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of credit default swaps to act as financial accelerators if a counterparty defaults, their use should 
be subject to increased supervision.  An A clearinghouse, or universal counterparty, for default 
swaps address the underlying institutional incentives that create moral hazard while also serving 
a useful circuit-breaker function.199 
Clearinghouses undertake four important functions.  First, clearinghouses can exclude 
low quality trading parties and limit trading to repeat players.200  Second, clearinghouses can 
ensure transparency in the trading system, providing market participants transparent information 
on pricing.  Third, clearinghouses can ensure liquidity in a marketplace.201  And finally, 
clearinghouses undertake an important mutual insurance function.202  When a member of a 
clearinghouse fails, the clearinghouse steps into its shoes and completes the trade.  Without that 
function, failure by one party in a transaction could transmit through the financial system.  The 
clearinghouse, through its insurance function, can act as a circuit-breaker, creating confidence in 
the ability of counterparties to complete transactions and limiting the degree to which 
weaknesses in one counterparty can transmit themselves throughout the financial system.203   The 
clearinghouse can thus dampening the effect of financial accelerators.   By acting as “a party to 
all trades” the clearinghouse is able to “mutualize” the risks of opportunism and thus adequately 
                                                            
199 Establishment of a central clearinghouse for derivatives is currently under consideration.  Reuters, NY Fed to 
Meet to Form Counterparty for CDS Market, Oct 10, 2008 available at www.cnbc.com/id/27115549/ and see Paul J. 
Davies, Credit Derivative Drive Hits a Wall, FINANCIAL TIMES, February 2, 2009 at 14 (discussing clearinghouse 
proposals).  
200 Jon R. Moen and Ellis W. Tallman, Clearinghouse Membership and Deposit Contraction during the Panic of 
1907, 60 J. ECON HIST. 145, 147 (2000) (clearinghouses are able to generate significant amounts of member specific 
information).   
201 Moen and Tallman, supra note 200. 
202 Randall S. Kroszner, Can the Financial Markets Privately Regulate Risk? The Development of Derivatives 
Clearinghouses and Recent Over-the-Counter Innovations, 31 J. MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 596 (1999); also see 
Randall S. Kroszner, Lessons from Financial Crises: The Role of Clearinghouses, 18 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 157 
(2000) and Moen and Tallman, supra note 200 at 147.  
203 In that way clearinghouses can engage in 'contingent integration at times of distress'.  Vertical integration can be 
an effective private ordering solution when faced with the prospect of moral hazard.  Randall Kroszner, Can the 
Financial Markets Privately Regulate Risk? The Development of Derivatives Clearinghouses and Recent Over-the-
Counter Innovations, 31, J. MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 596, 607 (1999). 
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monitor market participants.204  In times of stress, the clearinghouse provides a mutual insurance 
function (carrying out a temporary vertical integration of all market participants), thus 
guaranteeing trades and stopping the daisy-chain liquidation dynamic of financial panics.205   
Clearinghouses also maintain the power to exclude.  The power to exclude reduces 
incentives for participants to engage in moral hazard.   Because continued access to the 
clearinghouse structure requires that they refrain from opportunistic behavior, market 
participants have an incentive to more closely regulate their own risk taking behavior.  Of 
course, the exclusion power requires that clearinghouses are granted rights undertake close 
oversight of market participants.  While clearinghouse participants may have some incentive to 
take risky bets knowing that the clearinghouse will step up in the event they default, this risk can 
be mitigated by clearinghouse rules that permit the clearinghouse access to highly specific 
information about its members, their liquidity as well their participation the market.206  Access to 
this level of information would permit the clearinghouse to understand the net risk position of 
every member of the clearinghouse and thereby be able to place trading restrictions on members 
operating in excess of prudential limits.  
On balance, a mandatory clearinghouse for derivative trades, through repeal of the 
CFMA’s exemption for counter derivatives would be socially desirable and would reduce many 
of the negative social costs associated with market participants’ previous failure to engage in 
private ordering with respect to these contracts.    
                                                            
204 Trusts that were not members of a clearinghouse suffered runs and got in trouble.  Randall S. Kroszner, Lessons 
from Financial Crises: The Role of Clearinghouses, 18 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 157 (2000).  And see Ben Bernanke, 
Clearing and Settlement during the Crash, 3 REV. FIN. STUD.133, 144 (1990). 
205 Kroszner, supra note 204 at 159. 
206 Bernanke suggests that a clearinghouse may not be able to survive a 'meltdown' event.  However in the case of a 
meltdown event, the Federal Reserve must be thought of as part of the clearing system and should step in to provide 
liquidity.  Bernanke, supra note 204 at 145. 
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Although the credit default swap acts like an insurance contract in many respects, it also 
shares attributes of a short sale against an equity position.207  Importantly, the lack of a 
requirement that one of the parties to a default swap have an insurable interest at stake gives the 
contracts the malleability that permit the creation of synthetic securities.208  The lack of an 
insurable interest requirement also buyers of default swaps to engage in a form of “naked” 
shorting.  Naked shorting involves selling an equity which you do not own in an attempt to profit 
off price declines.  Naked shorting is illegal in US markets.209  Buying default swaps, essentially 
a bet that the reference entity will fail, of a entity in which the buyer of the swap has nothing at 
stake is not.   
In the absence of a transparent and liquid market for default swaps, market participants 
can, and likely do, engage in short selling via a default swap position.  Consequently, transaction 
costs are high for market participants seeking to engage in short sales.  However, if 
clearinghouses are instituted for the trading of default swaps these markets will become much 
more transparent, thus lowering transaction costs for market participants seeking to engage in 
taking naked short positions in an equity by way of a default swap.   
In order to forestall excessive naked shorting in a more transparent CDS market, 
proposals to require an “insurable interest” together with a CDS contract should not be dismissed 
                                                            
207 In a short sale, one expects the future price to be less than the current price.  When that is the case, one can 
borrow a share of stock on day 1 promising to return it to the owner on day 2.  After borrowing the stock, the short-
seller sells it on the open market.  On day 2, the stock price falls.  The short seller then buys a share on the market 
and returns it to person who lent it to her.  The short seller profits from the difference between the sale price on day 
1 (high) and the purchase price  on day 2 (low).    
208 Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution in the Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps, Insurance and a Theory of 
Demarcation, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP & FIN. L. 167, 173 (2007) (discussing the lack of insurable interest requirement 
for default swaps). 
209  SEC, Naked Shorting Selling Rule available at http://sec.gov/rules/final/2008/34-58774.pdf . 
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out of hand.210  Requiring an interest permits investors who wish to hedge a transaction with a 
counterparty to access the markets in order to do so.  On the other hand, by not permitting naked 
default swaps, regulators can limit the ability of such default swaps to act as a financial 
accelerator.  
The likely consequence of an insurable interest rule will be the end of synthetic derivative 
products involving a reported 80% of default swaps.211  This may be controversial in some 
circles.  However, given the recent experience with default swaps, and synthetic derivative 
products in particular, the burden of proof should be on defenders of the synthetic derivative 
product to prove such products are more valuable than the systemic risks they generate as 
financial accelerators and providers of market leverage.212   
 
C.   The Rating Agency Problem 
The ratings agencies played a central role in facilitating the development of information 
asymmetries.  In short, investors relied on the rating agencies to act as reputational 
intermediaries.213  As such, their ratings provided an important heuristic for investors who found 
CDOs and default swaps too complex to understand themselves.  In hindsight it is now clear that 
rating agencies failed as reputational intermediaries and that the value of their ratings as 
heuristics was circumspect.   
                                                            
210 Cong. Collin Peterson, chairman of the House Agriculture Committee has introduced legislation to prohibit 
naked CDS contracts.  This draft legislation may be too restrictive in that it requires both a buyer and a seller of a 
default swap to have an interest in the event.  It may be more appropriate to require a financial interest on only one 
side of the transaction.  See Discussion Draft of Derivatives Markets Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009 
(on file with author). 
211 Credit Default Chopped, FINANCIAL TIMES, February 2, 2009 at 12. 
212 Goldman Sachs, FORM 10-K (filed with the SEC on January 27, 2009) (citing the risk to its business in the event 
default swaps are subjected to regulation). 
213 Kroszner, supra note 203 at 609.  
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Others have already noted the consequences of the inherent conflict of interest that arises 
when rating agencies become dependent on large percentages of their revenues from only a small 
number of sponsors of structured finance vehicles.214   This conflict is evident by the shear 
number of AAA rated structured finance products on the market.  By one estimate, there were 
only 12 AAA rated corporate bond issuers at the end of 1008 while at the same time there were 
almost 64,000 AAA rated structured finance products. 215 
The rating agencies have also been the subject of recurrent regulatory fixes: First, 
following the collapse of Enron and now in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis of 2008.216  
More recently, rules promulgated by the SEC increase disclosure required of rating agencies, 
particularly as their work relates to the rating of structured finance products.217   They also 
eliminate obvious potential conflicts of interest as they relate to the work of the consulting 
operations of the large rating agencies by prohibiting a rating agency from rating any investment 
vehicle that it had a hand in designing.218  
The SEC has proposed additional rules to deemphasize the value of the rating agencies’ 
regulatory licensing power.219  These proposed rules seek to deemphasize the power of rating 
agencies by writing them out of the rules.  For example, a mortgage-related security is defined in 
Section 3(a)(41) of the Exchange Act as, among other things, “a security that is rated in one of 
                                                            
214 Blankfein, supra note 171; and also Joshua Coval, Jakub Jurek and Erik Stafford, The Economics of Structured 
Finance, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2009).  And also SEC Staff Report, supra note 97 at 23, 32 (noting that 11 sponsors 
accounted for 80% of the structured finance deals in both number and volume).    
215 Blankfein, supra note 171. 
216 THE CREDIT RATING AGENCY REFORM ACT OF 2006 (PL-109-291);  Securities Exchange Commission, 
Amendments to Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Release No. 34-59342, February 
2, 2009 (hereinafter NRSRO Amendments). 
217 NRSRO Amendments, supra note 216. 
218 Many rating agencies have affiliates that offer clients a service providing guidance on structuring transactions so 
as to receive the highest possible rating.  The conflicts presented by these activities is not dissimilar to the conflicts 
presented by auditing firms undertaking consulting work for their audit clients.   NRSRO Amendments, supra note 
216. 
219 SEC Release No. 33-8940 (July 1, 2008); and also SEC Release No. 34-58070 (July 1, 2008).  
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the two highest rating categories by at least one nationally recognized statistical rating 
organization.”220  The SEC proposes to eliminate references to rating agencies in its new 
definition of mortgage-related securities, focusing instead on other factors more relevant to the 
definition of such an asset-backed security. 
  The SEC’s focus on reducing the regulatory licensing power of rating agencies follows 
earlier work by Professors Partnoy and Skeel recommending a similar approach.  Their approach 
to deemphasizing the position of rating agencies is largely correct.221  Rather than increase 
reliance on rating agencies Professors Partnoy and Skeel suggest relying instead on the default 
swap market for signals about the likelihood of default of bonds and structured finance 
vehicles.222  This is a controversial position given recent events with respect to the default swap 
market.  However, subject to sufficient regulation of the marketplace (as outlined above), default 
swap markets will likely be a more accurate forward-looking metric of the likelihood of default 
than the current rating agency alternative, which has been criticized for being backward looking 
and not providing investors with useful information regarding the likelihood of future events.223   
Section 7: Conclusion 
This Article analyzes the Financial Crisis of 2008 in the context of failures by market 
participants to engage in private ordering thus leading to opportunistic behavior at the expense of 
market stability.   The Financial Crisis of 2008 offers a decidedly negative verdict on a decades-
long project to deregulate financial markets and rely on private ordering mechanisms, including 
securitization and default swaps, to mitigate opportunistic behavior and improve market 
                                                            
220 SEC Release No. 33-8940 (July 1, 2008) at 7 citing 15 USC 78c(a)(41). 
221 Partnoy and Skeel, supra note 145. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. 
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efficiency.  Although these mechanisms may have been intended to add to market resilience, 
they have instead proven to be a source of additional information asymmetries and instability in 
the marketplace. 
The regulatory approach of the past two decades, which relied in great measure on 
private parties fending for themselves helped to generate a number of innovations and positive 
developments in finance, but failed ultimately to result in more resilient financial markets.   
Indeed, since the 1970s global financial markets have been more susceptible to booms and 
crashes than any time since the 1930’s.224  As a consequence, we are left struggling for a new 
regulatory path forward that recognizes that market participants are not homo economicus, but 
rather human agents subject to the frailties of euphoria and perhaps even the occasional self-
delusion.225 
The events of 2008 suggest that private ordering as a central component of the regulatory 
effort has largely failed to create resilient financial markets.  The deregulation of bank holding 
companies resulted in large concentrations of banking institutions that have proven themselves 
dangerously fragile and excessively prone to taking on risk in the form of CDOs.  The exemption 
of default swaps from oversight and regulation resulted created a moral hazard so large as it to 
threaten the entire financial system when certain counterparties took on more risk than was 
ultimately prudent.  The theoretical underpinning of each of the deregulatory moves above was 
that private ordering would result in socially efficient outcomes as each party to a particular 
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transaction sought to protect its own self-interest.  In each case, however, private ordering failed 
to constrain opportunistic behavior. 
What is needed as part of this refashioning is to closely examine the institutional and 
micro incentives (including incentives of agents) in order to address the question of excessive 
reliance on heuristics that ultimately hobbled markets leading up to the Financial Crisis of 
2008.  With respect to mortgage lending and securitization, this may mean adopting new models 
of financing, such as the covered bond.  In fact, given the current experience of the investing 
public and the resulting availability heuristic that will likely linger for some time, markets may 
demand regulatory changes of this type with respect to securitization before investors begin to 
actively invest again.  With respect to default swaps, institutional incentives to take on more risk 
than optimal might be addressed by the establishment of a universal clearinghouse for default 
swap transactions.  Both of these changes recognize that the earlier hands-off approach relying 
on sophisticated investors to protect themselves will likely have to be abandoned for an 
alternative approach.   On the other hand, the NRSROs have clearly failed to perform their 
intended private ordering function.  Changes with respect to their role will likely require that we 
deemphasize their role and thus look for alternative mechanisms to signal the credibility of 
potential borrowers to lenders.  With respect to NRSROs these changes may require that we rely 
more on market based mechanisms than we have previously.    
Forward looking changes to our regulatory approach will require that we recognize the 
failures of an ideological devotion to markets as regulators and adopt a posture of pragmatism.  
This new era of pragmatism begins with an understanding that markets are useful but subject to 
their own limitations.  Such limitations include the effects of transaction and agency costs on the 
proper functioning of the marketplace.  They also include an understanding that market 
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participants often deviate from assumed behaviors.  We know from the work of behavioral 
economists that deviations from market outcomes, like over-optimism leading to speculative 
bubbles, are often predictable.   The proper role of regulation in such circumstances should be to 
recognize the inherent biases and then reduce the likely negative externalities associated with 
such behavior.  Such a pragmatic approach balances maximization norms with a requirement for 
stability in the financial system resulting in less systemic risk and a more sustainable growth 
trajectory going forward.  
